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Compensation for Inadequate Professional Services
By Richard Moorhead, Professor Avrom Sherr, and Sarah Rogers 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies1
"Compensation n. 1. The act of making amends for something. 2. something given as 
reparation for loss, injury, etc. 3. the attempt to conceal one's shortcomings by the 
exaggerated exhibition of qualities regarded as desirable." The Collins Concise 
Dictionary, 1982 edition.
"The Committee process is slightly like palm tree justice in that it is done on the reading 
of papers and the gut feeling for the case" Law Society Committee Member
Introduction
In any decision-making situation there is a gap between the formality of a rule and the 
basis of the decision itself. Even where the rule is clear, differences of approach will 
operate. This report examines these issues for one sphere of the regulation of solicitors: 
compensation for Inadequate Professional Services (IPS). It explains how different 
philosophical underpinnings for compensation decisions drive different approaches and 
how the level to which compensation should be set.
Section 37A and Schedule 1A of the Solicitors Act 19742 ('the Act') gives the Law 
Society Council the power to take certain steps, "where it appears to them that the 
professional services provided by [a solicitor] in connection with any matter in which he 
or his firm have been instructed by a client have, in any respect, not been of the quality 
which it is reasonable to expect of him as a solicitor."3 The "steps" are (in order of 
frequency of use): 4
1 This work was funded, in part by the Office for the Supervision of Solicitors. We gratefully acknowledge 
the help of anonymous OSS staff and Law Society Committee members through allowing themselves to be 
interviewed and in providing documentation and statistical information. We would like to extend our warm 
thanks to the Legal Service Ombusdman, Ann Abraham and Nick O'Brien, her Legal Adviser, as well as 
Marlene Winfield of the National Consumer Council, for taking the time to discuss the research with us. 
Pam Page-Bailey, of the OSS, has also proved crucial in securing information and documentation from the 
OSS. Responsibility for errors and omissions are our own.
2 As amended by the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.
3 See, paragraph 1(1), Schedule 1A, Solicitors Act 1974.
4 Section 37A refers to the remedies as steps rather than remedies, sanctions or powers. This view of 
frequency of use derives from the first OSS Annual Report.
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1. Directing the solicitor to pay compensation to the client of up to £ 1,0005 ;
2. Disallowing all or part of the solicitor's costs;
3. Directing the solicitor to rectify an error; and/or,
4. Directing the solicitor to take such other action in the interests of the client as may be 
specified at the solicitor's expense.
IPS is not, of itself, professional misconduct. Rather it is a regime for dealing with poor 
service complaints. There is also the possibility of IPS sanctions being supplemented by 
conduct sanctions where a complaint is a 'hybrid' of IPS and conduct elements, or where 
IPS is particularly serious or persistent.
The Law Society Council has delegated the power to find IPS and direct action 
(including compensation) to the OSS staff and various sub-committees of the society's 
Standards and Guidance Committee made up of lay and solicitor members. The OSS 
came into being on 1 st September 1996. As part of its Business Plan for 1996/1997, it 
committed itself to a review of sanctions, within the broader framework of desiring an 
"open, efficient and effective system for handling core business which has the confidence 
of the Profession and establishes [the OSS] as the guardians of professional standards." 
That too is supplemented by a general aim of pro-actively policing for compliance with 
professional standards.
This report begins with a review of research and literature on complaints handling, 
relevant to the compensation limit. This offers some client perspectives on the use of 
compensation powers. It is followed by an analysis of the statutory origin of the 
compensation powers and the legal framework governing compensation for IPS. As a 
result it is clear that there are competing philosophical approaches to the resolution of 
client complaints. In particular, the use of the compensation power can be seen as 
punitive, regulatory or restitutionary in nature. This exposes an important debate about 
the role of a profession's regulator in service (rather than conduct) complaints.
Once these philosophical positions have been examined, a more detailed description of 
how the OSS actually deals with service complaints where compensation can be awarded 
is set out. The report describes the process of complaint handling by the OSS and 
provides the opportunity to see how philosophical approaches and contradictions are 
manifested in the work of the OSS. It is built on an analysis of OSS documentation, a 
review of a sample of compensation decisions, and interviews with OSS staff and 
members of the Law Society's client relations sub-committee who act as the appeal body 
from first instance decisions by the OSS.
Where the bill was delivered after the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 came into force.
/. Literature review and background to the debate
In publishing his 1994 report the then Ombudsman stated his view that there was a 
"strong case" for increasing the limit for compensation for IPS, "certainly to £2,000 and 
possibly to £5,000".6 This appears to have been prompted hi part by a National 
Consumer Council Report which was trenchant in its criticisms of the SCB.7 This report 
called for an independent complaints council with powers to award compensation of up 
to £5,000. Similarly, the Bar Council's Standards Review Body recommendations 
(finally agreed in 1996) to have a compensation limit of £2,000 financial loss arising 
from inadequate service called into question the level of the compensation limit. Other 
factors continued to contribute to a questioning of the limit. In particular, the £1,000 
limit remained static from 1991 whilst the small claims limit was increased, first to 
£3,000 and more recently to £5,000 in April 1999.
The level of the limit is not the only issue of interest to the OSS, the Law Society and to 
other interested parties. The basis of awarding compensation and even the term 
compensation itself causes some concern and suggests very different approaches to the 
use of the IPS award. There are three main philosophical approaches to the directing of 
IPS remedies.
1. Remedies should be restitutionary. Clients would be put in the position they would 
have been in but for any inadequate service. Quantification then becomes a technical 
exercise, based on quantifiable or * special' losses and on more general awards for 
inconvenience and distress. Such quantification might include a costs reduction (an 
adequate job would have cost less) and compensation (the aggravation and loss 
caused by inadequacy should be compensated) as well as the possibility of further 
directions for remedial action. Perhaps crucially, the assessment of loss is client- 
centred: it focuses on what a service was worth to a client and what the inadequacy 
cost that client.
2. Remedies should be punitive. This philosophy suggests that solicitors should be 
punished for breaches of IPS, and should perhaps be punished more severely for 
repeated breaches of IPS. This approach seems to be more controversial (legally and 
theoretically) in that the Council's statutory powers generally appear to relate to 
individual matters of IPS rather than the adequacy of a solicitor or firm's service as a 
whole:
"The Council may take any of the steps... ..where it appears to them that the 
professional services provided by him in connection with any matter in which he
6 Legal Services Ombudsman (1995): Fourth Annual Report of the Legal Services Ombudsman 1994 
(London: HMSO), p. 9.
7 National Consumer Council (1994): The Solicitors' Complaints Bureau: a consumer view (London: 
NCC).
or his firm have been instructed by a client have, in any respect, not been of the 
quality which it is reasonable to expect of him as a solicitor."8
The use of the word "compensation"9 in the Solicitors' Act also suggests a presumption 
that the payment is for compensation rather than for some broader punitive purpose, and 
the fact that compensation is limited to the particular client, adds further weight to the 
claim that repeatedly weighty payments should not properly be awarded as compensation 
under Schedule 1A, Solicitors Act 1974. In any event repeated breaches may also be 
considered as a conduct issue under the more general rules relating to conduct and 
competence. As a result, there is a separate body of rules governing punishment and 
discipline. 10
3. Remedies should be regulatory. A regulatory approach appears to permit both a 
resitutionary approach (re-establishing the relationship between professional and 
client, or at least righting the wrong to the client) and a punitive one (punishing 
regulatory breaches as a deterrent to further breaches within the firm by other 
solicitors complained of and more widely in the profession). An example of a 
regulatory approach to IPS is the OSS stated policy that failure to respond properly to 
complaints, e.g. by operating a Rule 15 procedure, will itself be evidence of IPS and 
may increase compensation awards.
This section reviews literature illustrating the potential for these three different 
philosophies to influence complaints procedures. Although this analysis is applicable to 
complaints handling generally, for brevity's sake the discussion here is confined to 
compensation and costs reductions. The complainant's viewpoint is considered first.
The Complainant's Viewpoint
Research into complainant's views invariably shows high levels of consumer concern 
about solicitor's complaints handling. 11 The causes of such concern are complex, relating 
to both process and outcome. The level of compensation payments and the rationale for 
such decisions is only one subset of issues for clients and is not a major focus of research 
into client concerns to date. There are, however, findings of specific relevance to the 
handling of compensation decisions in the main, recent research on client complaints.
In April 1995, the Law Society's Research and Policy Planning Unit conducted a large 
scale postal survey of lay clients of the SCB whose complaints had (in the SCB's view)
8 See, paragraph 1(1), Schedule 1A, Solicitors Act 1974.
9 Paragraph 2(c), Schedule 1A, Solicitors Act 1974.
10 Moorhead et al (2000) Willing Blindness? OSS Complaints Handling Procedures (Law Society, London)
11 See, Moorhead et al (2000), pp. 13 - 26, for a more detailed review.
been concluded. 12 More recently the OSS has conducted an unpublished telephone 
survey of cases closed in 1996. Even allowing for a level of non-cooperation, which in 
itself showed strong hostility to the SCB and the Law Society, the 1995 survey 
demonstrated high levels of dissatisfaction with the SCB. 13 On Lewis's analysis, the 
factors which affected complainant satisfaction most strongly were about procedures and 
communication: complainants wanted simpler, faster procedures; evidence that the SCB 
staff understood their complaint; evidence that the SCB were prepared to deal with them 
in a way which was not over-influenced by the solicitors' perspective; greater powers in 
the SCB to require action from solicitors; and, more interaction and feedback from SCB 
staff about the progress and outcome of their complaint. 14
It is not surprising that lay clients would focus on the process of complaints handling. 
Indeed, Lewis's analysis is driven by the finding that when asked what was their most 
important expectation of the SCB, the answer clients most commonly gave was: that the 
SCB would, "Get in touch with [the] solicitor and sort things out." 40% of the 
respondents to this survey said this was the most important expectation that they had of 
the SCB and for 76% of the sample this was one, but not necessarily the most important, 
expectation. 15
As Lewis's figures make plain, the clients also had expectations about the outcome of the 
complaints handling process. Clients had a fairly strong expectation that the solicitor 
would be punished: 17% of clients saw this as their priority expectation and 51% of the 
clients had this as one of their expectations. Whilst, the report emphasises the fact that 
'relatively few' clients gave as their priority expectation the awarding of compensation 
(12%), the figures indicate that a much more sizeable 38% had compensation as one of 
their expectations. The comparable figures for costs reductions are 7% and 23%. In a 
more recent, but unpublished, 1996 survey ('the 1996 survey') complainant's expectation 
of compensation outscored an expectation that solicitors would be disciplined or 
reprimanded. 16
There are difficulties in grading and evaluating the client's priorities in this way. 
Nevertheless, the client population surveyed in 1995 and 1996 surveys showed the 
payment of compensation as a significant expectation although punishment was a
12 V. Lewis, Complaints against Solicitors: the Complainants' View (1995: London, Law Society, Research 
Study No. 19). For simplicity, the figures quoted in this report refer to Lewis's main sample, rather than 
the smaller, Practice Rule 15 sample, unless indicated otherwise.
13 Lewis, op.cit. p. 52. In the unpublished 1996 survey, 62% of complainants considered that the OSS had 
not resolved their complaint at all. 76% of complainants said the outcome did not meet their expectations.
14 See, Lewis, op.cit. xiv-xv.
15 Lewis, op.cit., p. 33.
16 See, also, Moorhead et al (2000), op.cit.
stronger expectation. These expectations were not usually met. Clients in the 1995 
sample said that compensation awards had been made in only 4% of cases. Conversely, 
costs reductions were made in 9% of cases. 17
Lewis also looked at the impact of the outcome of the case on complainant satisfaction. 
Where clients had been paid compensation as a result of the complaint they were more 
likely to be satisfied than dissatisfied with the outcome of the complaint. 18 The only 
other outcome where the client was more satisfied than dissatisfied was where the client 
saw that the, "SCB contacted [the] solicitor and sorted things out". Where clients had 
their bills reduced or refunded, they were nevertheless more likely to be dissatisfied than 
satisfied with the outcome of their complaint. The 1996 Survey shows very low levels of 
satisfaction with the outcome of complaint.
Such figures do not include any evaluation of the 'justness' of the outcome of the 
complaint. Client satisfaction is not, of itself, an indication that a decision was right or 
wrong. Nor can it be said from these figures that the awarding of compensation of itself 
led to higher satisfaction. 19 Other factors, such as the likelihood that where compensation 
was paid there had been a finding against the firm of EPS, may contribute to the client's 
satisfaction. Nevertheless, on the available evidence, an approach which sought to 
dovetail better with client expectation would place more emphasis on compensation 
awards (and less on costs reduction).
It is also worth stressing that, in spite of the award of compensation, a significant 
proportion of clients remained dissatisfied (39%). Lewis's results suggest that this will 
relate to other concerns over the quality of the process. Conversely, it may be because of 
perceived inadequacies in the level of compensation awarded or the justifications given 
for any award. Similarly, confusion over the basis for compensation might contribute to 
complainant dissatisfaction. One respondent to Lewis's study commented: "[the SCBs] 
powers as to reduction of costs and ordering compensation should be more clearly 
defined."
There is one further finding from the 1995 survey that is relevant to the issue of 
compensation levels. Where the outcome was that the SCB said it could not take the 
client's case, complainant dissatisfaction was marked: 92% of complainants whose 
complaints were dealt with in that way were dissatisfied with the way the SCB had dealt 
with their complaint. Among this group of clients there may have been included cases
17 Lewis, op.cit. p. 39.
18 Lewis, op.cit. p. 42.
19 The necessary analysis to make this assertion was not carried out in the 1995 report.
where the client had made a claim for IPS which included losses in excess of £1,000.20 
The £1,000 limit was a bar to the SCB satisfying these clients.
The National Consumer Council View
The National Consumer Council has also issued a number of reports into complaints 
handling by the solicitors' profession.21 High levels of dissatisfaction have been 
reported22 as well as a more deep-rooted philosophical concern:
"Research has been critical of complaints procedures that put too much emphasis 
on the legal concept of fault, and consequently too little on the resolution of 
grievance... Legalistic models of dispute resolution... may be responsible for 
this approach.... ..The danger with the "fault-based" approach is that it leads to
your responses to complaints focusing on issues that pose a risk to the 
organisation, rather than addressing the consumer's own specific concerns. It 
promotes a negative and defensive attitude to complaints (did we break any 
specific laws or duties?) rather than a positive and constructive approach (should 
we have done things better? Is there anything we can do to put tilings right?) A 
complaint system dominated by anxiety about legal fault can easily end up 
translating every complaint into something far more threatening than the 
consumer intended."23
In 1994, the NCC recommended compensation be awardable up to £5,000 by a system of 
Ombudsmen.24 It's recommendations were backed by specific criticism of the 
implementation of the IPS regime and the £1,000 limit. In its view, the opportunity to 
salvage some unity from the fragmentation of poor service, conduct, over-charging and 
negligence remedies via the IPS route was being lost, in particular for negligence-IPS 
cases, because although, in the NCCs view, the Solicitors Act permitted an award of 
compensation for IPS and negligence: "Anecdotal evidence from the calls and letters we 
regularly receive at the National Consumer Council suggest that people who would prefer 
to use the Bureau are turned away early on because the value of their complaint exceeds
20 See, LSO (1997).
21 See, in particular, National Consumer Council (1985), In Dispute with the Solicitor (NCC, London); 
(1994), The Solicitors Complaints Bureau: a consumer view (NCC, London); (1995), Complaints against 
solicitors: the future? Our response to the Law Society (NCC, London); and more generally, (1996), 
Putting it right for Consumers: a review of complaints and redress procedures in public services (NCC. 
London) and (1997), An A-Z of Ombudsmen (NCC, London).
22 See,NCC(1994),op.c#. 
23 NCC(1996),op.c//.
24 NCC (1994), op.cit. p. 4.and (1995) op.cit. p. 3.
25 This is a concern which has been partially supported more recently by the 
Ombudsman.26
The NCC's perspective indicated a desire for simplicity and clarity in dealing with IPS 
matters generally. It suggested that the existence of the £1,000 limit acted as a barrier to 
effective redress, operating to filter aggrieved clients away from the OSS back into the 
world of litigation. They also advocated a higher limit which would enable the OSS to 
operate a system of redress dealing with both IPS and negligence to a level equivalent to 
the small claims limit (as it will stand in April 1999) as an obvious, one-stop point of 
entry for aggrieved clients.
The NCC approach illustrates an interesting scepticism regarding fault-based and 
legalistic approaches to complaints. This relates to the technical machinery for 
adjudicating on complaints (the complexity and status of rules and procedures) as well as 
a broader philosophical concerns: that the system of complaints is about giving the client 
redress or * sorting their problem out' rather than about adjudicating on fault, or 
professional standards.
The orthodox view on introduction of compensation powers into the Act
Until 1991, there was no power to award compensation for IPS. The original powers to 
remedy IPS were contained in section 44A of the Solicitors' Act 1974 and were repealed 
by the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. As a result, IPS powers were shifted to a 
new S.37A, in a part of the Act which was not concerned with discipline and re-titled as 
powers of redress (under s. 44A they had been called powers to impose sanctions). At 
the same time the power of compensation was added to Schedule 1A of the Solicitors' 
Act. At the same time the power of the Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) to 
impose sanctions for IPS was removed.
This was a clear shift from seeing IPS as a disciplinary mechanism to seeing it as a 
system of redress, distinct from the disciplinary machinery of the SDT. This shift was 
sought by the Law Society and adopted by the Government. In introducing the new 
clause, the then Solicitor-General stated:
"..[T]he new powers will enable the society to take action, and direct payment of 
compensation to enable a client's clearly justified "small claim" to be satisfied.
"..[The amendments] draw a clear distinction between the society's disciplinary 
functions, dealing with matters of professional conduct, and its powers to deal 
with complaints about the quality of service provided. .. .disciplinary sanctions
25 NCC(1994),C^.d/.p.30.
26 Legal Services Ombudsman (1998), 7th Annual Report of the Legal Services Ombudsman 1997 (London: 
HMSO),p.l5.
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are not normally appropriate when a complaint relates to an isolated case of poor 
or negligent service, and where the more appropriate remedy will be to reduce the 
bill, compensate the client, or otherwise rectify the problem."27
This excerpt also makes plain a direct analogy between small claims and IPS as a system 
of redress. When questioned about the reasoning behind the £1,000 limit, the Solicitor- 
General stated the power was, "a small claims power to deal, in effect, in a comparatively 
summary way,"28 and that the intention was to have the £1,000 limit, "move broadly in 
line with the small claims limit."29 He also distinguished between compensating for 
shoddy work (or IPS) and negligence, which, "sometimes results in compensation for 
enormous figures" and is subject to the "full rights and safeguards" of the courts. 
Although it is perhaps most accurate to suggest the Solicitor-General was distinguishing 
IPS from higher value negligence claims. As the MP Austin Mitchell continued to push 
the Solicitor-General on the issue of the limit, the Solicitor-General stated:
"The issue is whether to have a relatively informal procedure which can operate 
quickly and sympathetically, but which must deal with a limited amount of 
money, or whether to deal with much higher sums. If the procedure were to deal 
with much higher sums, it would only be fair to both sides to operate a more 
elaborate procedure. There has to be a cut-off point, and I suggest mat this would 
be a sensible one both for the small claims court and for claims in relation to 
solicitors."30
The Solicitor-General accepted that the IPS powers were to cover claims under IPS and 
negligence for small amounts and that the limit was intended to be increased by reference 
to the small claims limit. Conversely, he distinguishes between IPS and negligence for 
large claims and so begins to recognise the difficulty of allowing the 'summary' 
procedure to govern large claims for loss.
Judicial and legal viewpoints on IPS and the use of powers under Schedule IA
Cordery on solicitors states unequivocally that IPS powers are, "regulatory, for the 
maintenance of standards, and not compensatory".31 This is surprising given the 
existence of a power of compensation in the legislation but there is some basis for the
27 Hansard, House of Commons, Standing Committee D, 12th June 1990, pp.410-411.
28 Hansard, House of Commons, Standing Committee D, 12* June 1990, p. 411.
29 The intention to charge clients a fee refundable if the client succeeds (unless they were on legal aid) was 
also stated: op.cit. p. 412.
30 Op.cit. pp. 412-413.
31 See, J.A. Holland (ed.), Cordery on solicitors (London : Butterworihs, 1995), para. 403.
regulatory label. It is found in the case of R v Solicitors' Complaints Bureau, exparte 
Singh & Choudry (a firm) [1995] 7 Admin LR 249, although it is worth looking more 
closely at that case, to understand what the Court may have meant.
Singh & Choudry sought to challenge a finding of IPS under s. 37A Solicitors Act 1974. 
As a result of a finding against the firm, they had their costs reduced to zero and they 
were directed to repay the Legal Aid Board the costs that they had claimed under the 
green form scheme. One basis of challenge was that the decision of the SCB and 
subsequent appeal tribunal was Wednesbury unreasonable. This was firmly rejected. 
The other basis dealt more directly with the nature of the Schedule 1A procedure. This 
challenge was on the basis that a finding of IPS required prejudice to the client. This is 
roundly rejected by Lord Taylor LCJ:
"We take the view that in order to show that the quality has not been such as was 
reasonably to be expected of solicitors, the failure does not have to be shown to 
have prejudiced the client or to be capable of doing so. The object of the 
provision is not to enable an aggrieved client to bring any claim against the 
solicitors; it is not therefore a provision which requires proof of damage. The 
object of the provision is disciplinary. It is to assist in maintaining the standards 
to be achieved by solicitors and to provide sanctions in terms of costs and 
payments if the proper standards are not reached. It is the quality of the service, 
in our judgment, which is of importance in applying the relevant provision, not 
the consequences of any shortcoming on the part of the solicitors." (emphasis 
added).
The issue decided was whether the SCB power to find IPS in the absence of prejudice or 
damage and not whether a particular step under Schedule 1A was appropriate. Nor were 
compensation payments discussed by the Lord Chief Justice beyond his reference made 
above to, "sanctions in terms of costs and payments " (emphasis added).32 Nevertheless, 
if Lord Taylor's words are given a broad interpretation, compensation would be related to 
the quality of service not the consequences of inadequacy for the client.
It is possible, and more appropriate, however to see a two tier approach in the language 
of the Solicitors Act 1974. A finding of IPS is clearly disciplinary in nature but 
directions under para 2, Schedule 1A, Solicitors Act 1974, should be more interpreted 
under the language of the directions themselves (i.e. that compensation is genuinely 
compensation rather than a fine). Similarly, paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 1A requires the 
Council (and hence the OSS) to be satisfied mat in all the circumstances of the case it is 
appropriate to make the relevant direction for (say) compensation under paragraph 2. 
This poses an additional burden or restraint on the OSS. Hence, it could be argued that a 
finding of IPS is not enough in itself to give a particular direction to award compensation
32 Similar, general acceptance that there are disciplinary elements within the scheme is set out in R v The 
Law Society (The Solicitors' Complaints Bureau, ex parte Shuttari), 21 February 1996, although the 
transcript is corrupted and does not deal with the issue with regard to the power of compensation.
10
under paragraph 2 and that some loss (however defined) needs to exist for compensation 
to be awarded.
This is not a distinction that is explicitly envisaged by the Lord Chief Justice in his 
judgment and paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 1A empowers any of the steps in paragraph 2 
to be taken where a finding of IPS has been made (i.e. it could be read that any step, 
including compensation, can be taken regardless of prejudice). However, in R v. the 
Council of the Law Society, ex parte Pictons Smeathans33 the two-stage approach is 
endorsed:
"The first two paragraphs of the Schedule [1A] contemplate a two-stage process: 
The power to find that work has not been of the quality that it was reasonable to 
expect from a solicitor and then the power to take steps congruent on the finding 
which include a determination that the costs to which the solicitor would have 
been entitled to for the work should be limited to reflect the fact that his work was 
not of the required quality."
The issue of what would be a 'congruent* exercise of the power is not settled by this 
decision: does the nature of the breach dictate the sanction (e.g. the seriousness of the 
breach against a hierarchy of professional rules) or does the implication of the breach to 
the client (work carried out to the standard that it was carried out was only worth £x, 
hence the bill of costs should be reduced accordingly)? The answer is not made clear, 
congruence could be offence-centred (punitive), deterrent-based (regulatory) or 
compensatory (restitutionary).
To understand when compensation can lawfully be awarded, a number of general points 
should be emphasised about the statutory drafting of the IPS powers in Schedule 1A and 
in particular the old powers under Section 44A.
The original of IPS powers were clearly labelled as disciplinary sanctions in the amended 
Solicitors Act 1974. Such powers did not include compensation. The Law Society 
Council were uneasy about the 'penal' or 'disciplinary' label of the IPS powers. This led 
to the replacement powers under s. 37A Solicitors Act 1974 which instead of being 
called disciplinary powers were entitled "Redress for inadequate professional services".34 
In addition, section 37A was located in a different place in the Solicitors Act 1974 (i.e. 
not as part of the disciplinary proceedings sections (ss. 46-55)). Similarly, the use of the 
word can be compared to Section 47 Solicitors Act 1974, where the word 'penalty' is 
used for a power to fine.
Furthermore the repeal of Section 47A by Section 93(4) of the Courts and Legal Services 
Act 1990 removed the powers of the Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) to impose
33 Unreported; QBD, 15th February 1996.
34 The Council's 'unease' is discussed in para. 5 of Dutton's, op.cit.
n
"sanctions" for IPS. This emphasises the point that IPS was no longer to be seen as a 
penal or disciplinary matter: the SDT may simply inform the Council of its belief that 
action should be taken under the IPS scheme.35
As a result whilst judicial opinion on the power to find IPS has pronounced on the 
disciplinary or regulatory nature of the power, the Act specifically requires that remedies 
be appropriate in all the circumstances or, in the words of the Pictons Smeathans case, 
"congruent on the findings". Both the genesis of current powers, and the structure of the 
Act deliberately emphasised the non-disciplinary nature of the remedies. The ordinary 
principles of interpretation suggest that the judges could, and perhaps ought, to look 
simply at what the Act says: what does 'compensation' mean? Two dictionary 
definitions suggest quite clearly that the powers are restitutionary rather than punitive or 
regulatory.
"Compensate v. 1. v.t. counterbalance; recompense (person for thing); ... 2. 
v.i. make amends (for thing, to person.)...". The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 
1982 edn.
"Compensation n. 1. The act of making amends for something. 2. something 
given as reparation for loss, injury, etc. 3. the attempt to conceal one's 
shortcomings by the exaggerated exhibition of qualities regarded as desirable." 
The Collins Concise Dictionary, 1982 edn.
This suggests that compensation means just that: payment as reparation for loss, not 
punishment or a sanction designed to meet broader regulatory ends. This fits with the 
alterations in the structure of the Solicitors Act 1974 made by the 1990 amendments and 
the new 'title' for the relevant section but does not fit with the tenor of Lord Taylor's 
dicta in Singh and Choudry. In any event Lord Taylor's points are not made with 
specific reference to the power to avoid compensation.
On balance then the power to award compensation, if it is to be exercised in accordance 
with the intention of the Act, should only be used to compensate the client for losses, it 
should not be used as an element in a punitive decision or a payment for regulatory 
purposes. This compensatory approach would not be necessarily confined to financial 
losses: distress and inconvenience could fall within the power of compensation (this 
would be consistent with the Singh and Choudry case where it was held that prejudice 
was not necessary to find IPS). However, one proposal mooted by the Law Society that 
there should be higher levels of compensation for repeat offender approach to increasing 
sanctions may be unlawful within the context of awarding compensation.
35 Para. 8, Schedule 1 A, Solicitors Act 1974.
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Similar arguments could be applied to other powers under paragraph 2 of Schedule 1A, 
although with less weight. Schedule 1A appears to create a two stage process. For the 
first (the finding of IPS) courts have said clearly that the power is regulatory. The 
decision as to which steps to take under paragraph 2 is one which must be appropriate in 
all the circumstances. Appropriateness must be tailored to the powers used. Hence under 
paragraph 2(d) the power to direct "other action" is explicitly limited to action in the 
interests of the client. This narrows the purposes to which the power can be put in a way 
that paragraph 2(b) does not. 2(b) permits the ordering of rectification of (inter alia) 
deficiencies arising in connection with the matter in question. So, broader concerns 
about (say) management structures or training within a practice might be addressed under 
2(b) but not under 2(d).
The position of costs reduction is perhaps least clear. It is a power vested in the Council 
to determine entitlement to costs for sub-standard work. Obviously, the concept of 
Wednesbury reasonableness would act as some check on the use of the power. There is a 
persuasive argument that this power should be confined to reducing costs to a level which 
reflects the worth of the case to the client (or a third party funder, such as the Legal Aid 
Board). This might reduce the costs to the client to zero (and enable compensation to be 
paid on top for actual losses).
It is clear that cost reductions can be made over and above any finding on taxation.36 
This could be read as allowing the Council's view of what a case is 'worth' to trump that 
of the Court (which may have proceeded to tax a bill in the absence of any finding on 
IPS). Conversely, it could be taken as evidence that, the Society is not bound by purely 
financial considerations when making its determination (i.e. that it can operate as a form 
of punishment).
Equally a regulatory approach might allow the Council to say that for certain types of 
breach the level of service was so below that which could be reasonably expected of the 
practitioner that they should not be able to charge for it and costs should be reduced to 
zero, even if the work had some value to the client. The decision in Singh and Choudry 
supports that argument although in that case it could quite clearly be argued that no 
worthwhile work was done for the client and so no costs should be paid. As already 
demonstrated, that decision focuses primarily on the ability to find IPS and not the 
precise basis on which the power to take steps can be taken. It is clear, however, that 
there is no basis in the Act to suggest that the power to reduce costs could be used as a 
way of awarding extra compensation beyond the £1,000 limit.
Cost reduction decisions could conceivably be justified on the basis of:
36 Paragraph 4, Schedule 1A, Solicitors Act 1974. R v The Law Society (The Solicitors' Complaints Bureau, 
exparte Shuttari). 21 February 1996, unreported. The transcript is corrupted but the basic point made here 
is clear enough.
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1. What the case is worth to the client as a result of the breach (an 'economic 
evaluation').
2. That IPS breaches are of a type for which practitioners should not be able to charge 
for services (a regulatory approach).
3. That the level of inadequacy is such that a partial reduction in costs is justified on the 
basis that inadequate work dictates an inadequate fee. In this sense, the costs 
reduction is not measured by the impact on the client of the IPS breach or the overall 
value of the case to the client. It reflects an assessment of the breach itself (i.e. how 
serious is it on the 'scale' of IPS breaches) (a punitive approach).
Tied to the second and third steps, it is conceivable that the courts would accept an card 
approach which increased the level of cost reductions for repeat offenders. The basis 
would be that practitioners should not be able to charge, or charge fully, where their work 
has been shown to be repeatedly inadequate. The lawfulness of using the second and 
third options in this way is questionable, although the courts have been willing to accept 
in general terms the disciplinary nature of the IPS scheme. The OSS might, for clarity 
and safety, decide to stick to an 'economic evaluation' of what costs should be.
How is the conceptual basis of compensation important to the quality of OSS work?
The above review of research; the competing judicial opinion and the Statutory origin of 
the IPS power illustrates conceptual frameworks for compensation. Consumers want 
speed, clarity and redress. They also want punishment and regulatory resilience 
(expressed as not wanting what has happened to them to happen to others). The judiciary 
have seen the power to find IPS as regulatory and disciplinary in nature. They have not 
directly commented on compensation, the only new power introduced by the Courts and 
Legal Services Act amendment of the Solicitors Act 1974, which took effect in 1991. 
Conversely, the structure of the Act and the genesis of the 1991 changes should make the 
position reasonably clear: the power is compensatory not disciplinary.
The competing conceptual viewpoints have vexed the Law Society and the OSS in the 
search for a philosophy which drives the awarding of compensation for IPS. There are a 
number of aspects to the problem. The conceptual basis of IPS remedies affects:
a) the relationship between the OSS and firms of solicitors in setting and policing 
standards (self-regulation);
b) the relationship between the OSS and the complainant (professional reputation); and,
c) the nature and purpose of the OSS's dispute resolution and complaints mechanisms 
(technical aptitude).
Paragraphs a) and b) are often perceived to be in conflict. At its heart, conflict over how 
to deal with consumer complaints is indicative of broader tensions between
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professionalism, consumerism, external regulation and the forces of competition. In 
particular, business-oriented and client-focused approaches to service (complaints 
procedures; emphasis on costs advice and the need for clear communication, particularly 
of merits and timescales of cases) have begun to force their way into the professional 
lexicon as an attempt to shore up professional reputation at a time of vocal consumer 
concern. This has met with resistance from practitioners on the ground (through the 
failure to implement Rule 15 procedures) which in itself calls into question the viability 
of self-regulation. 37
As will be seen below, in terms of the technical aptitude of the OSS systems, the OSS 
approach is informed in part by an adjudicatory approach (determining cases on evidence 
on a rule-based approach). This is used to exclude certain types of consumer complaint 
(especially negligence claims, see below), and, at least on occasion, exclude client losses 
(on the basis that IPS is 'not negligence1 and so, the sorts of losses that negligence claims 
would support are not compensable under the IPS regime). A pragmatic 'summary' 
procedure, whilst in theory operating to the benefit of the lay client, is also used as a 
justification for excluding loss on the basis that the procedures for handling IPS 
complaints are not sufficiently rigourous to test any evidence of loss and so that loss 
should not be compensable under the IPS powers. As a result, an adjudicatory paper- 
based approach of this sort, may tend to disadvantage complainants.
For compensation payments, exclusion of loss is premised on an acceptance of the 
limitations of a paper and telephone based process which operates to favour the law firms 
complained against. The exclusion of such loss is not supported by the legislative 
framework and seems to have grown out of the same acceptance of the limitation of the 
paper proceedings and the practice of caseworkers, which also focuses on the nature of 
an IPS breach rather than the consequences of any breach for the client. As a result the 
client's interests are subverted by the inadequacies of the procedure and an approach 
which is neither necessary in operational terms nor demanded by the legislative 
framework. The law permits, and may require, that the OSS take a restitutionary 
approach to compensation and the OSS case procedures could be improved, to clarify the 
basis of compensation and the collection of evidence for that. Once a finding of IPS has 
been made, the rules of compensation should focus most clearly on what the client has 
suffered, rather than on some analysis of how serious the breach of the rule is.
37 Christensen,ef al (1999) 'Learned Profession? - the stuff of sherry talk': the response to Practice Rule 
15? 6 International Journal of the Legal Profession 27.
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//. How compensation decisions are taken at the OSS
This section describes the process of complaint handling that leads to compensation 
payments. The description is based on written material provided by the OSS, interviews 
conducted with the OSS staff and a review of OSS decisions.
Outline procedure
Complaints from clients (and sometimes lay beneficiaries) have to pass a number of 
hurdles before being admitted to the OSS section dealing primarily with IPS, the Client 
Relations Office. Complaints which have not been dealt with in-house by firms will be 
referred back under Rule 15. Complaints may also be designated into departments other 
than the Client Relations Office. In particular:
  Where there are significant conduct elements, they may be referred to the 
Professional Regulations Unit for investigation of the misconduct element of 
the complaint.38
  In cases that involve negligence the OSS may decline jurisdiction. This may 
happen immediately on receipt of the complaint as part of the designation 
process or where a caseworker, following investigation of a complaint feels 
there is a prima facie case of negligence, the matter will be referred to a 
Negligence Panel Solicitor for free advice to the client on negligence.
Similarly the OSS may decline to investigate complaints where:
  a client alleges overcharging, although there are IPS breaches which relate to 
overcharging which can be dealt with by the Office (e.g. exceeding a written 
quotation or failing to give written costs advice);39
  the issue is the operation of a lien (again there are exceptions to the exclusion 
where there is "an obvious breach of principle)"40; or,
  where the OSS would be giving legal advice or commenting on legal advice 
given by anybody else.
It is clear from OSS guidance to caseworkers, that the likely loss involved will influence 
whether the OSS will accept jurisdiction. If loss of over £1,000 is being claimed by the
38 They may also be investigated simultaneously as 'hybrid' complaints
39 Such cases may be dealt with by the Remuneration Certificate procedure or by the courts through 
taxation.
40 See, OSS (1998): OSS Casework Induction Training (internal, unpublished, April 1998). This refers to 
principle 12.12, Law Society (1996) Guide to the Professional Conduct of Solicitors, p. 217,7th edition.
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client as part of their complaint there is a strong likelihood that the matter will be 
excluded as being a case for the courts.41
This initial designation of cases is conducted by senior caseworkers, senior advisers and 
Assistant Directors. A complaint which is designated as one requiring an IPS 
investigation is passed to a caseworker in the Client Relations Office. The normal 
procedure operating at the time of the research was:
1. Streamlined Procedure (negotiation/conciliation). The caseworker seeks to 
negotiate agreement between the client and the solicitors firm. If this is 
unsuccessful the case proceeds to investigation and report.
Procedure 6a. Where the caseworker believes the firm has made a reasonable 
offer for reducing their costs and/or compensation (the two issues are not separated 
out at this stage) and the client has not accepted the offer, then the case can be 
closed without going to the next stage i.e. without a first instance decision being 
taken or any compensation being paid. The client is advised by the caseworker in 
writing at some length as to the reasons why the OSS think the offer is reasonable 
and the case is closed. A Senior Adviser reviews the file and the letter before it 
goes out. This appears to deny the client the right of appeal to the Client Relations 
Sub-Committee. It is justified by the OSS as a means of support to professionals 
wishing to address complaints themselves by making sensible offers. In effect, it 
reflects an approach where a client declining a litigation-type 'reasonable* offer 
loses any remedy, although the client can still ask the Legal Services Ombudsman 
to look at the matter. The OSS would equally support a sensible offer by ordering 
compensation at the level suggested by the lawyer concerned - instead it awards 
nothing..
2. Investigation and Report. The Caseworker investigates the complaint (in so far 
as further investigation beyond the period of negotiation is necessary) and prepares 
a report. The caseworker does not necessarily look at the lawyer's file. The report 
recommends a finding as to whether there has been IPS and further recommends 
whether there should be a costs reduction and/or a compensation payment. No 
recommendation is made as to the precise amount of such compensation or costs 
reduction.
The report is sent to the client and the solicitors' firm for comment.
41 The guidance states: "As our compensation powers are limited to a reduction in the bill plus 
compensation of up to £1,000, attention should also be paid to the likely loss involved. Where this is not 
clear, the customer should be encouraged to obtain clarification before deciding whether to ask the OSS to 
continue investigating." Pp. 10-11, OSS Casework Induction Training (internal, unpublished, April 1998).
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3. First Instance Decision. That report is submitted with any comments from 
complainant and complained against that are received to a Senior Adviser (there are 
two of these) or the Assistant Director (there is one for Client Relations Office) for 
decisions under delegated powers as to:
a) whether there is enough information to make a decision
b) whether the caseworker's reasoning on the finding is satisfactory (and if 
not to reverse it)
c) deciding on what is the most appropriate remedy or financial award 
(including costs reductions or compensation).
This process will result in a finding as to whether or not there was inadequacy and 
whether or not any remedy is ordered. The client and firm are then written to 
informing them of the decision.
4. Appeal. These findings can be appealed on paper to the Client Relations Sub- 
Committee, which is made up of two lay members, on of whom chairs the 
committee, and one solicitor member (who is often a member of the Law Society's 
Council). Such appeals operate as a reconsideration, and both parties have an 
opportunity to comment further prior to the appeal committee sitting. Appeals can 
and do reverse findings of IPS and reduce compensation/costs reductions even 
where it is the client (and not the firm) that has appealed. This is on the principle 
that there should not be a 'no risks' appeal procedure for clients. This is likely to 
underline any perception of bias against the complainant. The client can take the 
matter further by asking the Legal Services Ombudsman to investigate the 
complaint and/or its handling. Equally they can increase compensation ordered at 
first instance.
Documentation and Guidance
The OSS was asked to provide all up to date guidance on the subject of IPS and the 
awarding of compensation. The following section is an analysis of the material received.
Defining Inadequacy
The starting point for any compensation award is a finding of inadequacy. The statutory 
framework provides a very loose definition of inadequacy. It is made clear by the OSS 
that it, "prefers to deal with each case upon its facts and merits."42 In written guidance, 
caseworkers are given shorthand types of inadequacy:
42 paragraph 1.3, Notes for the Guidance ofCRU Caseworkers in Inadequate Professional Service Matters 
(OSS document, undated).
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Insufficient - not doing all the work that is supposed to be done 
Substandard - work "not of a very good quality (e.g. poor documentation)"
Unsatisfactory - failures to communicate properly with the client or to keep the 
client properly informed
Ineffective - the work done was of no use to the client
No administrative decisions hang on these shorthands, and there is clearly some overlap 
between the categories. They seem to have been offered simply as aids to recognising 
IPS along with similar but more specific examples of when IPS would usually be found.43
The OSS guidance makes plain that the simple factual accuracy of a complaint is not 
enough to found an IPS finding: hence a client can be dissatisfied and the reasons for 
their dissatisfaction be proven but this does not necessarily amount to inadequacy. The 
specific, prima facie, examples of inadequacy44 are not automatically grounds for a 
finding of inadequacy: they are factors which, "must be viewed in the context of their 
seriousness when weighed up against the urgency of the case and the general 
circumstances surrounding." Conversely, the generally high or adequate quality of the 
work done will, "not preclude a finding of IPS if the one factor is sufficiently serious to 
warrant such a finding" although it is stated that the otherwise high quality of the work is 
relevant to the issue of redress.
IPS remedies
There is also written guidance on the steps that may be taken where IPS has been found. 
In relation to costs reduction, seriousness [of the IPS breach]; the length of time of the 
retainer; the importance of the matter to the client and the urgency of the matter are 
indicated as relevant factors. It is unclear how far, for example, importance of the matter 
to the client is an indication of subjective (what the actual client thought was important) 
or objective importance (what a reasonable client would think was important); or a 
mixture. Furthermore, an apparently overriding 'rule of thumb' is offered in the 
guidance: "the severity of the costs reduction should mirror the severity of the IPS." 
Similarly, a 'client-value* based assessment is ruled out: "it is not the OSS's function to 
assess the reasonableness or quantum of the solicitor's costs but rather, in the context of 
these costs, to assess the inadequacy of service." This guidance suggests a punitive or
43 Delay, failure to take instructions, failure to follow instructions, failure to keep the client informed, 
general incompetence or inefficiency, failure to give proper costs information, failure to comply with the 
overall principles of professional conduct (where such non-compliance would not amount to a 'conduct' 
complaint) or failure to take proper care of, or return, client documentation in appropriate circumstances. 
Ibid. para. 2.
44 See note 43.
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regulatory rather than economic approach. This guidance is supplemented by a remedies 
matrix which indicates clearly that different levels of severity lead to different percentage 
reductions in costs.
Guidance on compensation payments is as follows:
"Here the concern is with the consequences or prejudice to the client arising out 
of the IPS and the OSS would look for signs of:
specific expenses which have been incurred
inconvenience
annoyance
non-co-operation or where the solicitor has exacerbated the inadequacy, 
e.g. by failing to deal with the complaint in a proper fashion.
In awarding compensation the OSS is not awarding "damages" (so that it 
is not necessary to undertake a precise assessment of financial loss) but 
any award must be capable of justification on the evidence available and 
supported by reasons in the decision itself."
This guidance is clear taking a restitutionary approach to the client's complaint, whilst 
not being tied to a legalistic definition of damages, given the nature of the complaints 
process. It remains unclear whether inconvenience and annoyance are indications of the 
client's subjective perspective or a more objective test. The latter might be preferable (a 
client who is more annoyed than a reasonable client only gets the damages entitlement of 
a reasonable client entitled) and might justify the OSS's tariff-like approach (see below). 
However, there would also need to be capacity to take into account 'objective' client 
characteristics which make their increase compensable 'loss' e.g. age, infirmity, or ill- 
health.
The aggravating factor of non-cooperation with the complaints process is less clearly 
restitutionary in nature and smacks of being a penalty against recalcitrant solicitors. It 
may have added to the client's levels of inconvenience or anger but ordinarily it shortens 
the OSS inquiry and leads to findings against the solicitor. Conversely it appears to add 
to the client's sense of injustice.
Mitigating factors
The OSS guidance to caseworkers suggests that, "the effects of IPS may be mitigated if:
The solicitors (sic) has apologised; or 
taken steps to rectify bad workmanship; or
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made a reasonable financial offer by way of amends."
It is not clear whether such factors can counter what would otherwise be a finding of IPS. 
The use of Procedure 6A suggests it can.
What factors actually drive decisions
To get a clearer picture of what factors actually drive decisions, this research reviewed 30 
OSS decisions, interviews with two Senior Advisers (who decide on IPS remedies), a 
caseworker (hereafter these three are referred to collectively as "OSS staff) and six 
members of the client relations committee ('committee members').
Which remedy?
Where IPS has been found, the first issue is which remedy should be chosen. There were 
conflicting approaches in the OSS in deciding whether costs reduction should be chosen 
ahead of compensation. There was some recognition amongst OSS staff that they had 
been asked to consider compensation first. One of the OSS staff acknowledged that, 
they had, at the behest of lay committee members, been asked to consider compensation 
first. This staff member said that they always considered compensation now and almost 
always awarded something for IPS in respect of compensation. This had not been 
recognised by all the staff we spoke to. One was clear that the approach taken was to 
look at a case and see if costs reduction were adequate and, only if it were not would a 
compensation award be considered necessary. A third staff member said that cost 
reductions were looked at 'in the round'. Initially, first consideration had been given to 
cost reduction and then compensation but the approach was not one which was met with 
the sympathy of the committees and so caseworkers and senior advisers had moved 
towards considering costs and compensation together.
All interviewed committee members except one generally agreed that compensation 
powers were related to costs reductions. Partly this was because in some cases, notably 
legal aid or third party complaints, the complainant would not benefit. Implicit in that 
approach is a recognition that costs reduction is being used to provide economic benefit 
to the client. Several committee members saw compensation and costs reduction as a 
total package. One committee member went further, pointing out that problems due to 
the restricted level of compensation could be addressed by costs reduction.
At the same time, there was some consciousness that costs reduction and compensation 
could and ought to be used for different reasons. One member said reducing fees was 
seen as a strong signal to solicitors: a reflection of the level of professional service they 
have provided and it sends a good message to the consumers. Costs reduction was also 
recognised as being a method for promoting standards in a regulatory (and possibly 
punitive) sense by another committee member: where the work was truly, horrifically 
inadequate but there is little loss, they said the focus should be on reducing the bill. For 
this member, the award of compensation was limited to the client's damage and loss.
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The member who said that costs reduction and compensation should be dealt with 
entirely separately saw the matter as first requiring compensation to the client to 
recognise the stress that has been experienced plus an element for inconvenience. Then 
the bill should be taken and a look at the utility of the work carried out and how this 
relates to the client's anxiety. A significant cost reduction may be appropriate as a result.
What is compensation and costs reduction for?
Differences about the distinctiveness and choice of remedy were further reflected in 
differences of opinion as to what compensation and cost reductions should be for. The 
comments of committee members already make plain that there is some view that costs 
reduction is regulatory and some view that it should reflect the value of the work as 
diminished by the inadequacy.
For one member of the OSS staff, the cost power was essentially a power to reduce costs 
for a "naff job". There would be no costs reduction, and therefore compensation was 
much more likely to be awarded, where legal aid or other third party funding was the 
source of funding. This staff member did not use cost reduction to penalise the solicitor 
or to repay public funds. Delay, mistakes on documents and so on, would reduce the 
value of the job. Thus, in broad terms, the economic value for the job done was being 
looked at although equally what was not involved was a process of taxing costs or 
performing a remuneration certificate type role. Cost reductions were usually thought of 
in terms of a percentage reduction of the bill.
Conversely, for this staff member, compensation was basically there to address the 
clients' inconvenience: "compensation is not about punishment it is about redress." 
However, the same person was also wary of allowing clients to claim for losses arising 
from IPS. Cases where Rule 15 had not been followed, i.e. where firms had not been 
taking reasonable steps to deal with the matter within their client care procedure, would 
be more likely to receive an award of compensation as they would be seen as increasing 
the anxiety and hassle of bringing a complaint.
The second staff member agreed that compensation was for the degree of distress and 
hassle suffered by the client. Although other things would affect a decision: failure by 
the solicitors to try and sort out the complaint themselves would increase the likelihood 
of compensation. There was also an awareness that compensation could be used to deal 
with limitations on the OSS's ability to award costs for disbursements which had been 
incurred by the client via the inadequate solicitor.
The third OSS staff member also agreed that compensation was awarded for 
inconvenience and distress. They said, specific, concrete losses would be compensated 
for (such as storage and hotel costs in conveyancing cases where sale and purchase were 
staggered as a result of solicitor inadequacy). Other types of loss, which were less 
concrete, would not be compensated for.
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Committee members were also asked to indicate the criteria that they used in making 
compensation awards. The following factors were mentioned:
Committee Member A
"The extent to which the complaint is genuine - in some cases it can be six of one 
and half a dozen of the other.
"I look at whether it is a "difficult" client.
"The seriousness of the offence is relevant - there are some matters which can be 
put at different tariffs depending on how the offender has performed.
"The extent to which the client is put out. I look at this objectively - how much 
should the complainant have been put out.
"Failure to reply to correspondence particularly for a long period of time, is 
relevant, and also failing to reply to correspondence from the OSS moves it 
significantly up the tariff in my view."
Committee Member B
"It would be for distress and inconvenience. There are obviously degrees of 
seriousness here and we need to have an understanding of the extent and look at the 
extremes in the case.
"A tariff system should not be used. We should take account of the individual 
circumstances. The number of times that the complainant has had to contact the 
solicitor or the OSS and the vulnerability (e.g. age) of the complainant should be 
taken into account.
"So should the reasonableness of both parties." 
Committee Member C
"Inevitably I look at it from the solicitor's point of view. Do I think 
when looking at a case "here but by the Grace of God go I". I look at 
what has happened through my eyes with an understanding of the 
pressures that exist, but without covering up for colleagues. I am fairly 
tough on my own profession."
Committee Member D
"We look at anxiety as a result of delay and the degree of incompetence.
We look at what we would expect as human beings as adequate compensation. We 
look at delay and associated stress and incompetence together."
_
Committee Member £
"[It] is actually done on the basis of gut reaction... ..Whether the client has had a 
rough deal or a rougher than usual deal might lead the Committee to increase the 
level of compensation slightly.
"It takes quite a lot to upset those awards [made at first instance by the OSS]. It is 
noticeable that the lawyers on the Committee are kinder to the clients than the lay 
members and equally tougher on the lawyers."
Committee Member F
"We are not really awarding compensation but a measure of the seriousness of the 
inadequacy of the solicitor combined with the effect it had on the client.
"On a personal level I look at two fundamental things: Is it a widow/orphan case 
If I feel the solicitor has particularly let down his fellow professional 
colleagues."
"I am rather opposed to members who would like a matrix that they can consult 
when making an award as every case is different.
Committee Member G
This committee member did not answer this question directly but said at another 
stage of the interview:
"The aim is to compensate the client for the time taken to make the 
claim/complaint. I am not sure it is right to compensate for hurt feelings. 
Compensation is not on the basis of this and it is not appropriate for the client to go 
out for all they can. The compensation is for being let down."
Attitudes to 'Loss'
Attitude to compensating clients for their loss met with a varied levels of resistance from 
OSS staff. Staff Member 1 indicated that caseworkers were not asked to quantify loss. It 
was not felt to be their job to do that. Further resistance was expressed on the basis that 
clients, occasionally, simply said, "I want £1000. My case merits the maximum." And 
that the word 'compensation' could stir up emotive concerns in clients and a feeling they 
should be compensated for all "losses". This member of staff did not see this as the role 
of the OSS.
When asked about specific examples of loss, this staff member indicated no award would 
be made in compensation for new solicitors costs (where the complainant had instructed 
solicitors to handle a complaint) on the basis that there is no way of taxing those costs or 
knowing whether or not they were reasonable. Similarly, where clients said that they had 
suffered days off work as a result of the complaint, the staff member would not feel able
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to quantify that as a compensable loss. It would not be possible to know whether or not 
the days off work had been caused by the solicitor's IPS. It could also be argued that the 
client had been unreasonable to take time off work to respond to a complaint.
The second staff member felt that client losses would be taken into account to some 
extent in assessing compensation but was conscious that the OSS was not a court. In 
terms of raising such matters for report, it generally depended on whether the client 
raised losses with the caseworker. If they did, they might be included in the caseworker's 
report. It was clear there was no standard approach to the gathering of information about 
losses, nor indeed was there a presumption that any information would be collected about 
losses. The staff member felt that certain vulnerable clients would be likely to get more 
compensation. In particular, psychologically unstable clients might get higher awards 
because the solicitor would need to take more care with them and elderly clients might 
attract more sympathetic treatment.
The third staff member appeared more willing to consider client claim for losses, but 
remained a little wary being worried about drifting into awarding damages on the basis 
that a court might. As mentioned above, specific costs such as storage and hotel costs 
would be included within a compensation award. Compensation for days off work was 
less certain and clear. Caseworkers would not be expected to take reporting of loss that 
far. Time of work, for instance, would be dealt with under the general heading of 
inconvenience. Compensation was related to both the level of inadequacy and the level of 
impact on the client [i.e. it was not just related to what the client had lost, nor was 
compensation solely a type of sanction]. Where there are specific losses and those losses 
were, to the staff member's satisfaction, related to the solicitor's inadequacy, then they 
would be taken into account in the award of compensation.
Committee members were also asked what sort of losses should be (or should not) be 
paid for by a compensation award.
Committee Member A tended to approach this on the basis that compensation was also a 
deterrent to the solicitor. Compensation had a special damage basis (tangible losses) and 
a punitive element: the deterrent.
Committee Member B thought that compensation should focus on actual loss. This 
needed to recognise the time complainants had spent in dealing with the complaint; 
particularly given the way solicitors charge for their work. It was felt to be rude to 
ignore the fact that other people's time was valuable. Travel expenses and small 
expenditure should also be included. The member felt that a related issue was whether 
the system was available to everyone. For those on a low income the costs of 
complaining and pursuing a complaint might deter them, even though these costs are 
small they may be significant to some people.
Committee Member C felt any genuine and real losses should be compensated. In 
particular, anything that the Courts would regard as a head of damage in negligence or a
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breach of contract case including loss of opportunity (e.g. the opportunity to buy or sell a 
house) should be compensated.
Similarly, Committee Member D felt all losses, if precisely calculable, should be worked 
out and met by compensation. Generally, the approach of the committee to IPS 
compensation was to address subjective concerns (i.e. hurt feelings etc.), but both the 
objective (i.e. readily quantifiable losses) and the subjective should be addressed.
Committee Member E felt that generally compensation was for emotional pain and 
suffering. But in extreme cases, where there was no negligence, then something towards 
financial loss might be sensibly awarded. Similarly, in blatant cases of negligence a 
maximum compensation award would be made which might reflect a gesture towards the 
sometimes considerable financial loss suffered by the client (the member cited a case 
where a complainant lost her home, as a result of the solicitor advising her, and her 
husband, negligently and in a clear conflict situation). The member was prepared to 
consider out of pocket expenses, but not special damages. Conversely, the member felt 
the Committee should have scope to consider the loss of opportunity and injury to 
feelings. The member did not want to spend time assessing in depth claims but felt a 
discretion to do this should be available but not automatic.
Committee Member F felt that losses should not be taken into account at all as the 
Committee was not actually in a position to award 'compensation'. Essentially IPS 
compensation was for where the client is upset and the more general effect that a 
solicitor's IPS has had on a client.
Committee Member G felt the aim was to compensate the client for the time taken to 
make the claim/complaint rather than for hurt feelings. Conversely, "compensation is for 
being let down".
The Negligence IPS divide
The existence of a negligence issue has the potential to remove complaints from the OSS. 
There is a concern, identified for example by the NCC, that this acts as an inappropriate 
filter removing cases from the OSS which could be adequately addressed, to the client's 
satisfaction by the OSS. The views of committee and staff members on the distinction 
between IPS and negligence and its impact on the progress of a complaint were sought.
Staff Member One said that what distinguished negligence from compensation was the 
things people tried to recover rather than the cause of the action in itself. It was felt that 
the OSS did not have jurisdiction to investigate losses of the type associated with 
negligence and that it was possible to get a feel, almost from the complaint letter itself, 
whether it was a negligence or IPS matter. It was said that the OSS had tightened its 
procedures and training for dealing with negligence. This member also felt that the OSS 
were occasionally being used as a source of second opinion for clients who have already 
received advice on professional negligence.
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Staff Member Two put a slightly different gloss on the approach to negligence. It was 
only cases which appeared to show prima facie negligence that were referred out to 
negligence panelists. In particular, caseworkers would filter out cases where allegations 
were made which did not seem to have serious prospects of success. The OSS did not 
want to refer lots of useless cases to the negligence panelists. Similarly, the amount of 
any claim being made was crucial. If a case fell below the £1000 limit, but contained 
allegations of negligence, they would look to try and bring those cases within the IPS 
framework by identifying IPS issues. Even cases over £1000 could be and were brought 
under the OSS remit, if IPS issues could be separated from negligence issues. It was said 
that something which influenced a decision as to whether or not to take an 
IPS/Negligence claim was whether the client was practically capable of taking court 
action for negligence.
Staff Member Three candidly stated that this was an issue that had plagued the OSS and 
SCB since 1987 and particularly since 1991 when compensation powers were granted. 
IPS was more a matter of customer focus on the day to day practical aspects of running a 
case whereas negligence was more to do with legal/specific judgmental aspects. This 
staff member acknowledged that it was possible to say that all negligence was also IPS 
and so the OSS could take those cases on. It was also felt that when a letter comes hi for 
designation, there was not always enough information to point to either negligence or 
IPS. Quantum (i.e. the £1,000 limit) was one factor which would assist in saying one case 
was negligence or IPS but it was only one factor amongst many. It depended on what was 
being alleged by the client. Similarly, even where cases were referred out to negligence 
panel solicitors, it was still open for a client to bring a case back to the OSS even where a 
negligence panel solicitor had decided that the case did constitute negligence, if that is 
what the client wanted.
Committee members were asked if IPS awards should ever be made where there is the 
possibility of a negligence claim.
Committee Member A said yes, but felt that in nearly every case negligence and IPS 
were separate issues. IPS is a matter of conduct, whereas if a solicitor had indulged in 
negligence it was not for the OSS to second guess what might happen in another tribunal. 
If there was some misconduct in the field of IPS, the OSS should deal with this rather 
than turn away the entire complaint.
Committee Member B also felt that cases containing allegations of negligence ought to 
be addressed. It was felt to be very weak and cowardly not to deal with a case because of 
the possibility of negligence. The OSS was felt to have a responsibility to confront it.
Committee Member C felt that in debarring negligence type cases there was a risk of 
deserting the clients who had suffered the most serious forms of IPS. "If we walked 
away from every case where there was a possibility of negligence then those who had 
suffered the worst sort of IPS but who did not have grounds to bring a negligence claim 
would be stuck."
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Committee Member D also agreed. Each case should be taken on its merits although it 
was stated that it would not be sensible to take the possibility of a negligence claim into 
account in assessing IPS and awarding compensation, because then the client would 
suffer further delays. H echoed the comments of Members B and C: "It is not for us to 
decide that we don't confront a case as we find it."
Committee Member E was reluctant to admit negligence claims into the IPS mechanisms. 
The member pointed to the "very narrow limit between compensation and negligence". 
In negligence cases, it was felt, "the Law should follow the normal course of events. 
Proving a case can be difficult - although it is easier than it used to be and nowadays 
suing for negligence is no different than suing for debt collection. Negligence is usually 
pretty obvious.... e.g. missed deadlines etc.... though quantum may be arguable, liability 
is not necessarily." The OSS was felt to be the wrong forum for dealing with negligence.
Committee Member F (a lay member) felt constrained by perceived legal limitations on 
the OSS and the committee. "We aren't at law allowed to interfere with negligence. 
Complainants sometimes refer to negligence when they mean IPS. These must be sifted 
out. We shouldn't deal with real negligence. In a wider context - we could possibly deal 
with very minor negligence if it is too expensive for the complainant to get a claim going. 
It is a question of whether we should be allowed to do this, as at the moment we cannot." 
This is not an accurate view of the legal position, but it is understandable how it has 
come about given the OSS policy on complaints and it is interesting to note how the view 
has solidified in this committee member's mind into a legal bar on awarding 
compensation for cases involving negligence.
Committee Member G recognised the predicament of a client faced with making a 
negligence claim: "With no legal aid and the client possibly feeling emotionally battered 
they are often not going to be able to get a claim going. In view of that, and the 
difficulties that both those raise, then I wouldn't rule [allowing negligence claims under 
IPS] out. Obviously if it is an open and shut case of negligence, e.g. the deadline for 
issuing a writ is missed - then it must be passed on [to SIF]. Smaller/less clear 
negligence claims must be dealt with."
Attitudes to the £1,000 limit and its impact on awards of compensation
At the time this research was conducted, the limit on compensation for IPS was £1,000. 
The small claims limit in the County Court was £3,000. Part of the function of the 
research was to advise on an increase in the compensation limit. As a result staff and 
committee members were asked for their views on the £1,000 limt and increasing the 
limit. Staff Member One felt that straying beyond £1000 was to venture into the world of 
negligence rather than inadequacy and that the Courts were the correct forum for 
decisions on negligence. £1000 was a sensible level to express the inadequacy of service 
and, in particular, any distress that a client might associate with that.
The Staff member was asked to describe a case that had been awarded compensation at
the £1000 limit. This had been a case of inordinate delay in a medical negligence case of
_.
over 5 years. Whilst the Complainant could have changed solicitors, the staff member felt 
very angry about the way the solicitor had dealt with the case. It was a legally aided 
case, and therefore, no costs reduction would have helped the client. The client had 
suffered distress as a result of the delay. There had been no apparent loss of opportunity 
as the medical negligence case was an action that could not, and did not, proceed. The 
client had been advised there was no negligence claim against the solicitor when the OSS 
had referred the case to the Negligence Panel solicitor prior to the IPS being dealt with, 
"... in that there was no loss."
Staff Member Two sometimes felt that cases should be awarded compensation of over 
£1000 where "the service was just appalling". An example was where there had been lots 
of delay. A specific case was where the client's bankruptcy might have been caused by 
the IPS delay, although it could never be established on the file. There was also a 
suspicion that the solicitor was misleading the client. This staff member felt that the 
solicitors should be penalised for their handling in that case beyond the compensation 
level of £1000.
Staff Member Two also thought that a lot of the lower level awards of £100, £200 and 
£250 were a reflection of the comparatively low limit of £1000. The level of lower 
awards would increase if the £1000 limit was increased. This member felt that the low 
level of such awards, generated a lot of appeals although it was also stated that clients 
were sometimes simply being unreasonable and wanting the full £1000 for comparatively 
minor complaints.
The third staff member felt the power to award maximum compensation was being used 
more now than it had been previously. On several occasions more than £1,000 would 
have been awarded if there had been power to do so.
This member was asked to describe cases which reached the £1000 limit. It was felt this 
was much more likely to happen where the client would not get any benefit from a cost 
reduction. Where inadequacy was gross and the client was seriously disadvantaged then 
there would be a case where the £1000 limit would be reached. Again the mixture of 
discipline and restitution is apparent in this reasoning.
The specific example given was, as with colleagues, one of gross delay. "Awarding 
£1000 compensation was the only thing [the OSS] could do". The complainant was 
claiming specific loss of sorts which were regarded as a "legal matter" and the OSS could 
not deal with them.
This member was worried about increasing the £1000 limit very much beyond (say) 
£1500. The higher the award, the more specific the reasons for that award would have to 
be. The OSS would get involved in issues of mitigation and so on and that would cause 
problems. Conversely, this member was asked what the highest level of cost reduction 
was and was aware of a case of £22,000. Significant costs reductions seemed to cause 
OSS staff members no difficulty, these were almost always referred to by reference to a 
percentage of the total costs, and could rise to well beyond £1,000.
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Committee Members were asked how appropriate the current limit for IPS compensation 
awards was. If they did not think the level was appropriate, they were asked to indicate 
what level they thought it should be at and why. They were also asked, in what 
circumstances they would feel it appropriate to make a maximum award
Committee Member A thought the level should be, "at least £3,000. £5,000 is a bit stiff. 
I would be happy for there to be a further increase in one or two year's time." On 
making maximum awards he would adopt a regulatory approach which sought to reduce 
inadequate services by punishing repeat-offenders:
"The obvious one is for repeat i.e. serial defaulters. I am disinclined to give a 
firm the full whack for a one off first complaint. But for a second, third or fourth 
hit I would go for the maximum or near to it.
"It is very difficult to tie it down and to say what should be at the top and what at 
the bottom. The logic is to reduce complaints, and most complaints are about 
only 10% of firms - these are serial offenders - they should be hit where it hurts. 
I am reluctant to go for a very high award for the first time successful complaint. 
After all we are talking about shoddy work not professional misconduct or 
dishonesty."
Committee Member B felt the £1,000 award was not appropriate.
"My view is that the Committee and the OSS requires much more flexibility in 
awarding compensation. A limit of £1,000 does not reflect what consumers 
understand compensation to be and can appear as an insult.
The 'knock-down' effect of the £1,000 limit on more run of the mill complaints is also 
noted:
"If £1,000 is for the most serious cases, a scale is required and an award made 
low down or even at the mid point of the scale for long running complaints can 
appear like an insult to the complainant.
On the basis that we need to be able to make a reasonable spread of awards. I 
think a significant increase is needed, to at least £3,000 but preferably £5,000. 
This should then be reviewed on a regular basis.
The maximum award should be related to the following factors.
"I think it would be for distress and inconvenience. There are obviously degrees 
of seriousness here and we need to have an understanding of the extent and look 
at the extremes in the case. A tariff system should not be used. We should take 
account of the individual circumstances. The number of times that the 
complainant has had to contact the solicitor or the OSS and the vulnerability (e.g. 
age) of the complainant should be taken into account. So should the 
____reasonableness of both parties."__________________________
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The member stressed the extent to which the £1,000 tied the hands of decision-makers 
dealing with IPS compensation.
"My preference is for the Committee to have discretion. With a £1,000 limit they 
do not have this and so the maximum award is used too often because to award 
less is offensive. The limit needs to be higher so that discretion can be 
exercised."
Committee Member C also felt that £1,000 was "on the low side". The 'knock-down' 
effect was again apparent:
"The issues we have to deal with are sometimes very significant and it already 
seems to me that the maximum has to be reserved for the more serious cases 
which means that the awards that can be made have to be under £1,000. The limit 
could easily go up considerably. I would want a ceiling on our powers and would 
be happy for it to go up to £5,000. We could then make realistic awards.
Again, it was not felt that the limit should be static: "It could be linked to the small 
claims limit." It was also recognised that upping the limit might have knock on effects 
for the workings of the Committee: "If the Committee does have greater powers it has 
implications for the way things are done."
On maximum awards:
"It is hard to say... There are a few separate strands here - what loss 
has been occasioned/the degree of inconvenience/loss of opportunity. 
These are the effects of the IPS. There is also the degree of culpability. 
How inadequate was the service provided."
Where there were "high ratings in both areas" the maximum could be awarded, i.e. where 
there is loss and extreme inadequacy.
For Committee Member D, the current limit for IPS compensation was, "Quite 
inadequate," and should be replaced by a limit of at least £3,000.
For Committee Member E, the £1,000 was adequate. Maximum awards would be made 
where there has been, "extreme bad service that falls short of actual legal negligence. 
There must be some financial loss to the client as well. Upset to be dealt with by a 
reduction in fees and compensation should be used if there has been financial loss."
For Committee Member F the limit was described as:
"Totally and hopelessly inadequate if we continue to talk about compensation.
"The logical answer, therefore, is if [the award of compensation] is simply a 
measure of the seriousness of the inadequacy and the effect on the client it doesn't 
matter what the award is - it could be 50% bad or 90% bad. If we are talking
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about compensation plus an element of fine then tens of thousands of pounds 
would seem appropriate.
"My own view is that solicitors shouldn't be allowed to practice if they are 
basically inefficient, which is what IPS is. The only way to stop them is either to 
fine them such a large sum that they effectively go out of business or, for IPS, that 
there is input onto their practising certificate to say that they can only practice in 
the environs of an efficient firm.
On when maximum awards would be made:
"If a situation is hopeless. - i.e. the solicitor has made a complete mess and the 
client is upset then mis is a likely case for a maximum award. My approach is to 
look at the obverse - what good did the solicitor do, and if there is very little, give 
the maximum."
For Committee Member H, the limit might needed increasing, but modestly:
"I think that if people have actually been negligent then the client's redress is in 
negligence. We would be compensating clients for letters written, inconvenience 
and loss of time. I think the limit should be about the £1,000/£2,000 mark. 
£2,000 is possibly preferable."
This member would be inclined to make a maximum award:
"If the solicitor has been rude and aggressive in the treatment of the client. I am 
thinking here of private clients, commercial clients are different... The award is 
appropriate where solicitors have not tried to resolve complaints and have written 
rude and pompous letters to the client."
The interviews with OSS staff and committee members, both lay and solicitor, sh
ow 
some times quite marked differences in opinion, emphasis and approach to compensa
tion 
issues. Statements as to a theoretical approach to compensation awards, the maxim
um 
level and other issues to do with compensation must be treated with some caution. 
Nor 
should too much criticism be made of differences between OSS staff and between L
aw 
Society committee members. The differences do, however, reveal significant differen
ces 
in the perceived purpose of compensation powers (whether they are a redress mechanism 
for clients or a disciplinary mechanism for the profession). There appears to be much 
greater resistance to accepting negligence complaints within the Office staff group 
than 
within the committee members that we interviewed. Across both staff members 
and 
committee members, there was a reasonably broad level of support for increasing
 the 
compensation limit. The justifications for this, however, are not based on a consensus 
view. Several interviewees commented that the effect on the £1,000 limit
 on 
compensation was to knock down less serious awards to very minimal compensa
tion 
levels. Others commented that consumer expectation demanded high levels
 of 
compensation. Some wanted the limit increasing to provide greater flexibility
 of
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response by the OSS and the Law Society committees. Others felt that the limit should 
be increased to strengthen the disciplinary or deterrent effect of compensation awards.
The comments of OSS staff and committee members provide a rich account of the 
different perceptions and motivations behind decision-makers in looking at compensation 
decisions. However, from the perspective of clients, the critical issue is how OSS 
decisions are in fact taken. The report turns to this issue next.
Review of OSS Decisions
30 sets of OSS decision papers, chosen at random by the OSS from decisions taken 
during the late-Summer of 1998, were reviewed by the researchers. The decision papers 
consist of the caseworker's report and any subsequent correspondence from the client and 
the solicitor on that report as well as the form describing the basis and nature of the 
Senior Adviser or Assistance Director's first instance decision. These papers provided 
quite a lot of detail about the recorded reasoning and factual background for decisions.
In two of the cases there was no finding of IPS. In sixteen cases the OSS directed an 
award of compensation and hi fifteen cases a costs reduction was awarded. In three of 
these fifteen cases an award of both costs reduction and compensation was made. The 
factor which led to compensation payments being made in the remaining fourteen 
compensation cases was almost always that a costs reduction would not benefit the client. 
In five cases this was because the client did not fund the case (usually they were on legal 
aid) and in a further four cases a costs award was inappropriate for other reasons 
(because costs had already been litigated, taxed or subject to a remuneration certificate).
If these cases are typical of the OSS approach, then the dominant approach seems to be to 
look first to costs awards and only if costs awards cannot be made in a way that benefits 
the client will compensation usually be awarded. Some of the recorded reasoning 
illustrates quite clearly that this is the approach the caseworker is taking. For example in 
the following cases, these reasons were given:
" The solicitors' costs hi respect of the bill.. .. .were reduced upon application for 
a remuneration certificate to £xxx.xx plus VAT. I therefore determine that this 
is an appropriate case for an award of compensation."
"I have carefully considered whether an award of compensation is appropriate in 
this case.... ..I consider that the above costs reduction is sufficient recompense
for inadequacy of service."
There are a small number of apparent exceptions to the primacy of costs reduction. Most 
notably the cases where compensation and costs were both awarded. The reasons why 
compensation was awarded in these cases is also instructive. In one case there was an 
allegation of loss which, if compensated in full, would exceed the total costs reduction 
available. The total economic benefit to the client was taken much closer to the level of
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that claim as a result of a supplementary compensation award. The decision-
maker's 
reasoning also provides an interesting, partial acceptance of a client's loss claim:
"[The complainant] has incurred costs of £xxx.xx in respect of [the other side's 
costs]. On the evidence before me, I cannot conclude mat the entirety of these 
costs would have been avoided if the above inadequacies had not occurred but I
 
do consider that the amount of costs would have been mitigated."
The award of compensation was about one fifth of the total 'loss' claim.
In the second case, the client specifically requested that compensation be tak
en into 
account and there was a failure to respond to client complaints. In the third cas
e there 
was also a failure to respond to client complaints.
Interestingly, given the uncertainty of staff about the role of losses in calc
ulating 
compensation (or costs reductions) there was evidence of awards being made for: 
storage and van hire, lost interest on money which was retained by the firm or th
e Legal 
Aid Board as a result of inadequacy by the firm in question and the costs of ins
tructing 
solicitors in connection with the subject matter of the complaint. It appeared however 
that such losses had to be raised on the initiative of the client. The caseworke
r report 
form does not require a report on client losses.
There were however several instances where claims for losses by the client w
ere not 
addressed in the decisions or where stress and inconvenience, even where the
 client 
specifically raised the issue, was not met with any discussion of compen
sation. 
Furthermore, in seven of the fourteen cases where compensation was not awarde
d, there 
was no evidence in the decision that the decision-maker had considered whether o
r not to 
award compensation.
Similarly, there were occasions where, rather than address the linkage between a
ny loss 
and the finding of IPS the decision-makers utilised 'jursidictional exclusions' to do with 
'negligence' and 'loss'. Examples are:
In rejecting a part of the complainant's claim, it was "[T]his Office has no 
jurisdiction to consider allegations of negligence and I am not in a position to 
assess whether [the complainant] has been caused any financial loss as a result of 
the manner in which her affairs were handled."45
In another case:
45 This claim was for solicitors costs and interest on money held by the firm in ques
tion, something which 
has been compensated in other decisions reviewed by the researchers.
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"[I]t is not my function to determine whether the client has incurred a specific 
financial loss. I do not therefore consider it appropriate to take this into acc
ount 
in assessing what steps to take hi dealing with inadequacy of service"
Although this case involved a quite difficult loss to prove as being caused by
 the IPS, the 
nature of the evidential and reasoning exercise is similar to the partial comp
ensation of 
costs award referred to above. The decision-maker was the same hi both case
s.
This review of 30 cases shows quite strongly that the OSS decision-make
rs, although 
acknowledging and recognising that they had been asked to consider compen
sation first, 
do not appear to be doing that. The primary and often the only response of
 the OSS on 
these cases was to reduce costs. Although a significant number of compensa
tion awards 
were made, many of these were made hi circumstances where a cost reductio
n could not 
be effected or would not benefit the client. The official policy of the OSS 
committees 
and the stated reasoning of OSS staff members appears to have been cont
radicted by 
actual practice.
Interestingly, the OSS staff showed greater openness to the awarding o
f costs and 
financial losses than might have been expected from the interviews. More w
orrying was 
the unpredictable basis on which losses would be dealt with and the use of "jurisdictional 
exclusions*' in a way that is not necessary and appears not to be consisten
t across all 
cases.
Statistical Information
Statistical information provides a further backdrop to the OSS's handling of
 complaints. 
22,305 complaints were received by the OSS in its first year.46 The Annual R
eport does 
not clearly distinguish which of these allege IPS. As a result, it is very diffic
ult to build 
up an accurate picture of what cases may be compensable. It appears howe
ver, that hi 
1,237 cases compensation or costs reductions were agreed during conciliation
 and in 151 
cases compensation was ordered by the office.
It is also not possible to ascertain in how many cases the OSS declines 
jurisdiction 
because a case involves "negligence". The OSS statistics include catego
ries for the 
outcome of complaints such as the client accepting the OSS cannot remedy
 (about 879 
cases), complaint withdrawn and implied acceptance of the OSS response (over 3,421).47 
Over 4,289 cases are categorised as other and 973 cases were closed pending
 litigation.
46 including regulator matters, which could be estimated as being about 3,00
0 of that figure based on 
previous year's figures. See, Office for Supervision of Solicitors (1998): Annual Report 1996/97
 The First 
Year, p. 7.
47 Lewis's research showed the danger in relying on this sort of statistic. M
any clients whom the OSS 
thought had their complaints resolved, actually thought there matter was still pe
nding within the complaints 
structure.
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The latter may be the category most likely to contain 'negligence' cases but any of these 
categories, and particularly the first, would also be candidates. It is possible that a 
considerable number of cases are being excluded by the OSS because negligence 
complaints are made and/or the loss 'claimed' by the client exceeds £1,000. The OSS 
also do not currently hold the number of cases which are dealt with under "Procedure 
6A" described above. Future sets of published statistics should, if possible, include this 
information.
Over 2,000 cases are referred for First Instance Decision (many of which will include 
purely conduct-based complaints and, as such, will not be compensable). The Annual 
Report states that of these, in 537 matters a First Instance Decision relating to poor 
service was made. These broke down as follows:
151 resulted in compensation (iBVo)
145 resulted in reduced or limited costs (27%)
97 resulted in costs reduction and compensation (18%)
33 resulted hi disciplinary proceedings (6%)
62 in other action (12%)
In 49 cases there was no finding of IPS (10%)
The Annual Report does not provide a breakdown of the distribution of compensation 
awards from first instance decisions but states that the average compensation award was 
£325. Total compensation awarded against the profession was £80,743,48 The OSS has 
kindly provided the researchers with further breakdowns of compensation payments. 
From September 1996 - August 1997,13 maximum compensation payments were made 
out of 242 first instance decisions. The average cost reduction during this period was 
£791.42. This is considerably higher than the average compensation award during the 
period of the annual report and suggests that the total impact of cost reductions is more 
significant than the compensation payments. The highest cost reduction during that 
period was £13,657.50.
The OSS has also provided the Researchers with more detailed information for cases 
completing in 1998 since the Annual Report was published. In those cases where 
delegated (i.e. First Instance Decisions) were made, £1,000 compensation was awarded 
on 24 occasions out of 716 (3%). In 11 of these 24 cases compensation payments were 
ordered but no costs reductions were made. On 10 occasions costs reductions were made 
in addition to £1,000 compensation awards and in 3 cases the OSS case report is unclear 
(i.e. there may or may not have been a costs reduction). Thus in a significant proportion
48 Ibid, page 9. This figure does not include conciliated agreements on compensation and costs redu
ction.
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of cases, the client was receiving an economic benefit in excess of £1,000 as a result of 
the Office's decision to reduce costs. There is a possibility that the current OSS 
approach to compensation, as an unintended consequence, favours private payers. They 
are in effect not subject to the £1,000 limit. The approach of committee and staff 
members as identified during interview appears to support this analysis.
On their face, the OSS statistics provide little support for increasing the level of 
compensation. Average awards are modest and the percentage of maximum awards is 
low. Although there are indications that the number of maximum awards is growing. 
Conversely, it was the practice of the OSS in about half of the cases where maximum 
awards of compensation were made to award costs reduction as well. Economic redress 
to the client will then exceed £1,000. It is also clear from staff and committee members 
that the £1,000 limit has a trickle-down effect generally reducing levels of compensation 
as First Instance Decisions and Appeals reflect the perceived need to reserve the 
maximum award for serious cases of IPS and high loss.
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Other compensation providers
The Legal Services Ombudsman has unlimited power to recommend compensation 
against solicitors firms. Failure to meet those recommendations is rare and is met by 
publicity sanctions. The Ombudsman has indicated to the researchers that in cases where 
more than £1,000 compensation would be awarded, actual loss to the client would 
ordinarily be needed.
The Legal Services Ombudsman also publishes figures on the number of compensation 
awards made by the Ombudsman against lawyers (which would include awards against 
barristers and licensed conveyancers). The following table summarises these awards.
Table 1: Compensation Recommendations Made by the Legal Services
Ombudsman 1995 -1997
Level of compensation awarded 1995 1996 
against lawyers
Under £500
Between £500 and £1,000
Between £1,000 and £2,000
Between £2,000 and £4,000
Between £4,000 and £6,000
Over £6,000
Totals
54
8
9
1
1
72
91
16
2
2
2
i49
114
Source: Legal Service Ombudsman's Annual Reports (1995, 1996)
The 1997 report presents the statistics in a slightly different format. There is no 
indication of how many awards topped £1,000. The Ombudsman on one occasion 
awarded £5,000 for the shock of receiving a large (£30,000) bill "at the last minute" 
where costs advice had been "singularly lacking" and £6,801 for loss in another case.50 
Awards for loss were made in 20 cases (The average (mean) award was £730) and for 
distress and inconvenience in 117 cases, mean award £357). Although occasionally 
straying beyond the £1,000 mark, given that the Ombudsman is not subject to formal
49 The Ombudsman proposed compensation of £32,871 and as a result a settlement of £25,000 was agreed.
50 Legal Service Ombudsman (1998), op.cit, p. 14 and 28.
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limitation in terms of the amount awardable, the Ombudsman's recommendations are 
clearly relatively modest, especially for distress and inconvenience.
The Council for Licensed Conveyancers can award up to £1,000 for loss resulting from 
poor service, but have been criticised for making infrequent use of the powers.51
The Bar Council's Adjudication panel has power to award compensation of up to £2,000 
or to reduce, refund or waive fees. Compensation is restricted to actual financial loss.52 
By the time of the last Ombudsman's report, no compensation awards had been made in 
the first 9 months of the operation of the panel.53
There is wide diversity in the powers of Ombudsmen and professional bodies to award 
compensation and reduce costs. The following table sets out the position for 
Ombudsmen operating in professional and commercial service fields.54
51 Legal Service Ombudsman (1997), Sixth Annual Report of the Legal Services Ombudsman 1996 
(London: The Stationary Office), p. 1 and p. 12; and Legal Service Ombudsman (1996), Sixth Annual 
Report of the Legal Services Ombudsman 1995 (London: The Stationary Office), p. 3 and pp. 15-16.
52 Legal Service Ombudsman's Report (1996), op.cit, page 10.
53 Legal Service Ombudsman's Report (1997), op.cit, page 20.
54This table is derived from a review of A-Z of Ombudsmen: A guide to Ombudsmen schemes in Britain in 
Ireland (1997: National Consumer Council, London).
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Table 2: Powers of Ombudsmen to Award Compensation
Banking Ombudsman
Building Societies' Ombudsman
Ombudsman for Corporate Estate Agents
Funeral Ombudsman55
Health Service Ombudsman
Independent Housing Ombudsman
Insurance Ombudsman Bureau
Office of the Investment Ombudsman
Personal Investment Authority Ombudsman 
Bureau
Legal Services Ombudsman
Pensions Ombudsman
Adjudicator for Inland Revenue, Customs 
and Excise and Contributions Agency
Max
£100,000
£100,000
£100,000
£50,000
No limit
No limit
£100,00056
£100,00057
£50,00058
No limit
No limit
No limit
Typical/
average
£2,815
-
£40-£1,000
£900
£250-£500
£5,400
-
£4,120
£500-£5,000
£500-£5,000"
£60-£500
Highest
£56,740
£52,350
£13,000
£2,665
£4,000
£271,400
£66,670
£90,71259
£5,119
£124,000
£28,490
55 Of this up to £5,000 can be awarded for distress and inconvenience.
56 £20,000 for permanent health insurance. Recommendations unlimited.
57 £750 maximum for stress and inconvenience.
58 Up to £1,500 can now be awarded for stress and inconvenience, although increases are proposed in both 
limits (to £100,000 and £1,500 respectively), information supplied by The Legal Service Ombudsman's 
office.
59 Although the formal limit is £50,000, there is a voluntary jurisdiction which service providers can submit 
to, where the limit is £100,000.
60 For distress and inconvenience.
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The average or typical awards show some variation in the practice of Ombudsmen. 
Similarly, within the global maxima, there is often a cap on awards for distress and 
inconvenience that can range from £750 to £5,000.
A number of professional bodies were contacted to provide an indication of the 
arrangements other professional bodies have in place in relation to compensation for 
clients that complain about the quality of service they have received. They were asked to 
indicate, in addition to any ordinary legal remedies that clients may have (e.g. a 
negligence claim through the courts), whether the particular professional body made any 
provision for the payment of compensation (or the reduction of professional costs or the 
fining of members) where a client has complained of professional services which are of 
poor quality (whether or not those services are actually negligent). They were also asked 
to indicate the maximum amount of compensation awardable for such complaints and the 
basis on which any such compensation payment is ordinarily calculated.
Of those that responded, the Association of Chartered Accountants stated that they did 
not have a system for compensating inadequate services. Nor did they have any 
involvement in fee disputes. For breaches of professional conduct rules an Investigations 
Committee could impose fines of up to £1,000 and Disciplinary and Appeal Committees 
could impose fines of £50,000. They said, indemnity cover was required of its members 
and there was a compensation scheme for private investors losing money or investments 
as a result of poor investment advice where the accountancy firm has since gone out of 
business or been closed down (with a maximum £48,000 per claim).
The Chartered Institute of Management Accountants stated it had no system for 
compensating clients with complaints about quality of service. There were fines for 
dishonourable or unprofessional conduct of up to £5,000 and indemnity cover was 
required.
The Institute of Chartered Accountants has a relatively new power, through its 
Disciplinary Committee, to reduce fees in whole or in part up to a ceiling of £5,000.
The General Dental Council did not have any system of fining or compensation. They 
register and discipline dentists through the register itself.
The Insurance Brokers Registration Council stated that they had no such system. Clients 
would be expected to pursue their complaints through the courts for negligence. There is, 
however, the capacity to discipline brokers for unprofessional conduct. There is also a 
grant scheme covering claims for a broker's dishonesty. It is a fund of last resort.
It seems that the Law Society are unusual amongst the professional bodies in offering 
clients compensation for professional services. The lack of consensus amongst 
Ombudsmen on compensation suggests that a fruitful area of further research and policy 
formulation for Government would be to review the role of Ombudsmen generally within 
the civil justice framework.
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The courts have considered awards of compensation by Ombudsmen, see, Westminster 
City Council v Haywood and another [1996] 2 All ER 467. This followed a complaint to 
the Pensions Ombudsman pursuant to the provisions of the Pension Schemes Act 1993. 
The ombudsman found that the local authority was guilty of maladministration on the 
grounds that it had failed to warn Mr Haywood when he took voluntary redundancy 
about doubts as to the validity of its severance and compensation scheme and had 
therefore given him misleading or at least incomplete advice. He directed the local 
authority to increase Mr Haywood's monthly payments and to pay him £1,000 
compensation for distress and inconvenience. One of the bases of appeal, was that the 
Ombudsman had no power to award compensation for distress and inconvenience.
It was held at first instance that there was no pecuniary loss established as being a 
consequence of that maladministration. In the absence of such loss, there was no lawful 
basis on which the Ombudsman could direct the local authority to pay H a pension larger 
than that to which he (or any other pensioner in his position) was lawfully entitled. The 
Pensions Ombudsman could however order payment of reasonable compensation for 
distress and inconvenience, notwithstanding the fact that the power to make such awards 
had not been expressly created by Parliament. Indeed, if monetary compensation could 
not be awarded for non-monetary injustice, it was held that many complainants might be 
left without an effective remedy and the statutory function of the ombudsman would be 
frustrated. As such, an award of £1,000 was regarded by Mr Robert Walker J as high, 
but not so excessive as to be wrong in law.
The Court of Appeal61 reversed this decision on the basis that the Pensions Ombudsman 
had no jurisdiction to entertain the original complaint. The Court also went on to look at 
the remedies points. It held that it was clear that the maladministration recognised by the 
Ombudsman had caused him neither pecuniary loss, nor anxiety or distress. The 
complainant had not complained of disappointment, and had, in fact, received payments 
totalling £1,580 in excess of those to which he was lawfully entitled which he was not 
being asked to repay. The Court of Appeal found as a result that he had been fully 
compensated for any disappointment that he might have suffered. Accordingly, the Court 
of Appeal's view was that even if the Pensions Ombudsman had jurisdiction to entertain 
H's complaint and to award compensation for non-pecuniary loss, his award of £1000 for 
distress and inconvenience could not have stood.
"If, as the Pensions Ombudsman implicitly found, [the maladminsitration] 
consisted in the wrongful reduction in Mr Haywood's pension, then it might well 
be appropriate to compensate him, not only for his pecuniary loss, but also for the 
anxiety which he suffered until he knew that his pension was to be restored to its 
proper level. But once this analysis is rejected and the maladministration is 
identified as the failure to warn Mr Haywood that there was some doubt as to the 
amount of his pension, or as the promise to pay him more than he could lawfully
61 See, [1997] 2 All ER 84.
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be paid, then the basis on which the Pensions Ombudsman made the award of 
£1,000 can no longer be supported. Properly identified, the maladministration 
caused neither pecuniary loss nor anxiety or distress, but the reverse. The most 
that can be said is that it inevitably led to disappointed expectations.
"There would, in my judgment, have been two objections to upholding the award 
of £1,000 for disappointment. The first, which could probably have been 
overcome without too much difficulty, is that this (and the maladministration 
which gave rise to it) was not something of which Mr Haywood complained. The 
second, and more important, is that one consequence of what happened is that Mr 
Haywood received payments totalling £1,580 in excess of those to which he was 
lawfully entitled, and he is not being asked to repay them. Whether or not Mr 
Haywood could have been compelled to repay them is neither here nor there; but 
in my judgment, given the value which the Pensions Ombudsman placed on 
distress and inconvenience (which no one has argued was too low), the 
overpayments which Mr Haywood received have fully compensated him for any 
disappointment which he may have suffered by reason of the council's handling 
of his entitlement to retirement benefits
The Office of the Legal Services Ombudsmen has advised the researchers that:
"The restrictive approach of the courts to payments of compensation for distress 
and inconvenience colours and constrains the awards made by most, if not all, 
other ombudsmen in this country. PIA Ombudsman has recently increased the 
limit for his awards for distress and inconvenience from £750 to £1,500. The new 
Land Registry Case Examiner has an agreed limit of £5,000 for such awards. The 
Inland Revenue Adjudicator makes consolatory awards for distress, anxiety and 
inconvenience which are usually between £50 and £250, and do not exceed 
£2,000 even in the most extreme cases. The new CSA Case Examiner talks about 
her consolatory awards for gross inconvenience normally being about £100. The 
Banking Ombudsman regards the range as being between £50 and £5,000. The 
highest award for distress and inconvenience made by the Pensions Ombudsman 
is £3,000. The Building Society Ombudsman regards the normal range as being 
between £50 and £500. The Estate Agents' Ombudsman awards would not 
normally exceed £750. The Local Government Ombudsman would regard the 
normal range as between £200 and £1,000, but has made much higher awards 
than that: a complainant and her family received £10,000 for distress caused by 
persistent racial harassment over a period of 11 years; another complainant got 
£4,000 for the consequences of nuisance and harassment, including physical 
assault, over a period of 6 years. In 1997, the LSO's highest award for distress 
and inconvenience was £5,000, the lowest was £50 and the average was £350. 
The case reports in previous LSO Annual Reports suggest that awards of £500 
and £1,000 have been noteworthy, though not infrequent. Awards that high 
against either of the professional bodies would, however, be exceptional since 
most of these fall between £150 and £300."
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The importance of the Westminster City Council case is that it is possible a court asked 
to look at the issue of compensation within the context of Schedule 1A of the Solicitor's 
Act, 1974 would take a similar approach relying on actual loss, anxiety, distress or 
disappointed expectation so long as such loss, distress, anxiety or disappointment was 
directly related to the inadequate service. Equally, it indicates a certain judicial 
skepticism of large awards for distress and inconvenience.
Summary and Conclusions
The imposition, removal or moving of a limit for IPS compensation is, to an extent, 
arbitrary. There is no single obvious test for picking one figure over the other. However, 
a number of perspectives, provide important indicators.
Client perspectives support an increase in client compensation. They also support 
placing the client more centrally in the OSS approach to remedies. Compensation is a 
significant component in the expectation of clients complaining to the OSS: more so than 
costs reductions. Lewis's research suggests that compensation is also one of the few 
outcomes that appears to have a positive impact on complainant satisfaction. Where 
clients had their bills reduced or refunded, they were still more likely to be dissatisfied 
than satisfied with the outcome of their complaint. Perceived inadequacies in the level of 
compensation awarded or the justifications given for any award may contribute to a 
considerable residue of dissatisfaction amongst compensated clients. Similarly, 
confusion over the basis for compensation might increase dissatisfaction. It is also 
extremely likely that the barring of client claims for IPS or negligence that include losses 
in excess of £1,000, contributes significantly to public resentment of the complaints 
process.
The National Consumer Council has criticised a fault-based, legalistic approach to client 
complaints. It is difficult to conceive of a system which did not rely, to some extent, on 
rules and conceptions of fault. But the NCC's core concern (that such an approach 
promotes a negative and defensive approach to complaints) is valid, at least in so far as it 
relates to the handling of IPS remedies. Once an IPS complaint, or 'fault', has been 
substantiated, there is strong merit in the OSS taking a positive and constructive 
approach which, within the constraints of the legislation, seeks to put things right for the 
client. Fault having been established, the issue of remedies could be positive and client- 
centred whilst remaining fair to firms.
The analysis of IPS decision-making set out above highlights the considerable influence 
of fault-based, and disciplinary reasoning on the decision to award compensation. Fault 
and conceptions of punishment may be a hangover from the pre-1991 scheme. It is also 
clear that legalistic concepts of fault, damage, and 'negligence versus IPS' contaminate 
the reasoning of decision makers in ways which are unnecessary, and add extra levels of 
inconsistency to the process. This, allied to the investigation and adjudication paper-
based nature of the IPS conspires to exclude and minimise the extent of claims for 
compensation from clients. An OSS approach which sought to compensate the client in 
fall for losses which reasonably appear to have flowed from the IPS might go some way 
to reversing public scepticism of the Office, it would provide a clear overarching 
approach to compensation and would send clear messages to practitioners that IPS had 
consequences for clients which need proper, rather than symbolic, redress. This would 
require a change in approach to compensation and an increased limit.
At the moment, the attitude of decision-makers to IPS awards shows a cocktail of 
approaches: restitutionary; disciplinary and regulatory. This sends a mixed message to 
complainants and those complained against62 as well as to decisions-makers. It damages 
the credibility and consistency of the process. The dominant philosophy appears to be 
that IPS compensation reflects the decision-makers' views as to what constitutes 'really 
bad* IPS. The client's perspective is not always ignored, but it is distanced from the 
centre of the process. The OSS approach may also encourage a censorious attitude to 
firms. Ultimately, current practice is concerned with the extent to which professional 
standards have been breached rather than the impact on the client. Although it should be 
recognised that the two areas are not mutually exclusive, least of all in the minds of 
clients, this approach often appears to border on fining. Where the decision-makers step 
across this border it is probably unlawful.
The treatment of compensation for 'loss' requires firmer clarification within the OSS and 
committees. The justification that IPS compensation is 'not damages' is weak, is 
inconsistently applied within the office and, indeed, may be wrong in law. It is also 
unclear as a result what is 'not damages' and therefore legitimate compensation. On one 
level, although decision-makers did not always take this approach, the 'not damages 
approach' seeks to confine IPS to distress and inconvenience. This will artificially 
contain and diminish the nature of the client's concern and problem. Very concrete parts 
of the client's problem are seen as being irrelevant to the IPS mechanism, even though it 
may be very relevant to the client.
There is no formal impediment to the OSS awarding compensation for loss which is 
shown to have been incurred by IPS. This will leave the OSS needing to exercise its 
judgment on when IPS did or did not cause a particular loss. The cases reviewed by the 
research showed some indication that the OSS was willing to do this on occasion, 
sometimes for quite speculative losses. On others the clients were simply told that it was 
not the Office's function to assess specific financial loss.
Declining an award for loss is unnecessary and does not deal with the substance of the 
complaint. It must be better for the caseworker to base the compensation on whether the 
IPS appeared to cause the loss that the client alleges. Even if the end-result was negative,
62 An example is the tendency of complained against firms to seek lower awards of compensation on the 
basis of the cost already incurred by the firm in dealing with the OSS investigation. This 'plea in 
mitigation* approach is appropriate to a fine but not to a payment of compensation.
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such an approach would be more likely to satisfy the client. The claim would have been 
considered in full rather than pared down or rejected on a technicality. Nor will the 
results of such a causation- rather than fault-based approach always favour the client. The 
incantation of 'jursidictional exclusions' for specific financial loss is not performed 
consistently and should be diminished or removed from decision-makers approaches 
wherever possible.
Nor need the OSS's paper-based procedures act as a bar to recovery of such loss. If 
paper-based procedures form the basis of an assessment of whether there has been 
inadequacy it is difficult to justify not assessing loss on that basis. Indeed, to do so 
appears to be an example of the OSS utilising the simplicity of its procedures argument 
to counter the interests of the complainant. The main justification of such 'simple* 
procedures, other than cost to firms and the OSS, is to benefit the complainant. Yet the 
same justification is used for ignoring certain losses. This borders on the perverse. It is 
also worth noting that the 'paper-procedures', or the need for clearer reasons, or 
arguments about the fairness of the procedure to firms does not appear to provoke such 
concern when costs reductions are being considered by the OSS or by Committee 
members.
The problems of loss and fault are also an example of how the 'boundary dispute' 
between IPS and negligence contaminates other aspects of OSS thinking, especially on 
compensation. There is a sense in which, a desire to exclude cases which contain 
negligence, has broadened into an attitude whereby ideas associated with negligence 
(notably 'damages') have added an extra layer of exclusion into the complaints handling 
process.
A further problem is whether the OSS should be able to take negligence cases within the 
IPS mechanism. There is a clear overlap between IPS and negligence. The Solicitor's 
Act clearly shows that negligence in itself must be capable of amounting to "professional 
services provided by [a solicitor] in connection with any matter in which he or his firm 
have been instructed by a client [which] have, in any respect, not been of the quality 
which it is reasonable to expect of him as a solicitor."63 That definition of whether IPS 
exists must include cases where negligence exists and other cases which, although not 
negligent are, inadequate. As Schedule 1A of the Solicitors Act makes clear, a remedy in 
negligence does not bar an IPS complaint. If the OSS were to award compensation for 
losses clearly on the face of the awards issues of double jeopardy would diminish. The 
interface between IPS and SIF would need to be addressed. Implications for caseworkers 
and the investigative process would also need to be worked through. The difficulties are 
real, but not insuperable.
The position under the Solicitors' Act is that a case where there is negligence must 
amount to IPS. The OSS are not obliged, however, under the Act to take any of the
63 Section 37Aand Schedule 1A
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'steps' (or remedies) under Schedule 1A, such as compensation. There is a legitimate 
concern that the OSS ought not decide whether 'negligence* has occurred. They have no 
formal power to find negligence and there are implications for SIF if they were to attempt 
to do so. This is particularly the case were a solicitor to seek to claim IPS compensation 
against the SIF fond (although we understand that such claims could be excluded by 
amending the SIF rules) or where a larger (uncompensated) claim for negligence were 
made by the client which was then referred to SIF.
It is, however, open to the OSS to investigate the facts of any case where there has been 
IPS, consider allegations which might constitute negligence against the standard of IPS 
(i.e. whether the work is of a poor quality rather than negligence) and make a finding of 
IPS on that basis. The complainant satisfies an easier test and so the finding of IPS 
would not amount to a finding of negligence and ought not prejudice any subsequent 
negligence claim.
This report recommends that the OSS take a clear and client-focused approach to 
awarding compensation for IPS. This is consistent with the structure of the Act and will 
send a clearer message to the client that compensation is there to address the impact on 
them of IPS. This involves the client being compensated for distress, inconvenience, and 
any other loss that on a balance of probabilities has been caused by the IPS. It involves 
compensation being treated as the first remedy and the merits of compensation being 
considered in reasonable isolation from other remedies. The collection of evidence of 
loss need not be onerous or time-consuming. Caseworkers should be required to collect 
and present in a systematic fashion evidence and representations from both parties on 
losses, inconvenience and distress. This could usually be carried out by an appropriately 
worded letter. This will focus the minds of both parties as to the purpose of 
compensation and will demonstrate to the client that the OSS takes seriously the impact 
of IPS on them.
There are other aspects of concern which the decision-makers and clients might quite 
rightly want an outlet for: discipline and, in particular, regulatory resilience are matters 
which can and ought to be the concern of the IPS mechanism. The occasionally cavalier 
attitude of practitioners to client complaints and OSS investigations is shocking. Levels 
of IPS, either as gross one offs or as a pattern of concern about an individual or a firm, 
may also need addressing through the remedial framework provided by Schedule 1A. 
However, as stated above, there are good reasons of legal propriety, organisational clarity 
and cultural identity in treating compensation as solely restitutionary. For that reason, it 
is not recommended that increased compensation for repeat offending be considered by 
the Law Society.
Costs awards should not be treated as an extra avenue or (as appears still to be the case) 
the first avenue of compensation for the client. The use of costs reductions to increase 
compensation awards is evidently practised by the OSS. This de facto means there is no 
statutory limit on economic compensation for private paying clients but a limit for third 
party funded clients, most notably legal aid clients. Such an approach suggests that costs 
reductions are being used unlawfully. Costs reductions should reflect the diminution in
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value for the work paid caused by the IPS ('what was the case worth'). In certain 
circumstances, (i.e. where quotes have been given and exceeded without proper terms of 
business and costs advice) the solicitor might be confined to the level of the quote 
(essentially, the basis here is the level of informed consent to the costs incurred by the 
client). The 'what the case is worth' basis might conceivably reflect a disciplinary 
approach in that gross inadequacy quite literally diminishes the value of work, even if the 
client has gained 'value for money' from the costs incurred. The presumption should 
however be to use compensation to address client loss and grievance. Only where the 
specifics of the case demand it, should costs reductions be used in addition or in the 
alternative (one occasion would be where the solicitors work did not in any way advance 
the interests of the client - it could be therefore said to be of no value and the client 
should get those costs back). There are judicial review concerns if costs reduction is 
used as a disciplinary measure, although the decision in Singh and Choudry suggests that 
it is possible.
An important aspect for clients and the profession generally is that the firms "are not able 
to do this again". This might need to be addressed more firmly through directing the 
relevant solicitors to take steps under Schedule 1A such as training. Endorsing the 
practicing certificate is also a possibility but the significance of this might put a strain on 
the credibility of paper-based adjudication.
Amount of compensation
The parliamentary debates on the introduction of the compensation powers suggested that 
the IPS limit would keep pace with the small claims limit. This small claims limit was 
extended to £5,000 in April 1999. Clients have often had to deal with a hostile solicitor's 
firm and a dramatic loss of faith hi the professional dealing with them. To refer them 
back to a legal forum for disputes is something which the profession should avoid, not 
just on self-regulatory principles but on business principles. For these people their 
relationship with the firm, not uncommonly with the OSS, and on occasion with the 
profession itself has broken down.64 Such complainants will perceive themselves as 
'victims' asked to step into the territory of the 'perpetrator*. From a business 
perspective, the profession's reputation has suffered and such clients are very likely to 
communicate their dissatisfaction more broadly within their circle of friends and 
colleagues. One of the points of a complaints service is to tackle such dissatisfaction 
where possible rather than push it into the hostile ether of litigation.
64 "The profession appears rife with incompetence and self-interest. In future, I shall do my utmost to avoid 
ever consulting/employing the services of the profession again." Respondent quoted in Lewis, op.cit., p. 
48. "There have been past complaints about the Solicitors' Complaints Bureau being seen to side with a 
solicitor, even when it is clear the solicitor was in the wrong, which was why I understood a new office was 
formed. My own impression now is that almost nothing has changed and genuine grievances are not being 
dealt with efficiently, and the support of solicitors, where a real and genuine complaint exist (sic) is being 
drawn out, stalled, in order to find a way through to side with the solicitor." Comment of client from 
random selection of OSS decisions reviewed by this research.
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This report recommends that the limit for IPS compensation be extended in line with the 
Small Claims limit and that the limit be reviewed regularly to keep pace with the limit. 
At the same time, it should be noted that the inconvenience and distress that clients suffer 
may only exceed £1,000 in extreme cases. Such an approach would be consistent with the 
Ombudsman's approach and the apparent restrictions placed on such awards by the Court 
of Appeal. Other losses may take awards higher, but again the Ombudsman's approach 
does not suggest that such awards will be particularly frequent or onerous to the 
profession as a whole.65
There is an argument that the limit should be increased substantially beyond £5,000. If 
the OSS is willing to award costs reductions of £22,00066 then why shouldn't it be able to 
award compensation of the same amount? This is a difficult issue to address. The 
economic interests at stake become large and the necessity of testing evidence of 
causation, IPS and loss would become stronger. Beyond the small claims limit the client 
may have the benefit, in appropriate cases, of conditional fee arrangements. Litigation 
may not be quite as forbidding although some of these clients may have lost all faith in 
the legal profession. If a higher limit for IPS compensation were sought, or a limit 
removed, the OSS might also need to design a special procedure for such cases.67
Our analysis of decision-makers suggests a reasonably strong consensus, amongst 
committee members and OSS staff that the limit for compensation should be increased. 
Committee members on the whole want higher increases than OSS staff. An increase will 
provide decision-makers with greater flexibility and reduce the tendency to *knock- 
down* awards in the more minor cases.
A significant increase in compensation powers might encourage firms to take Rule 15 
and conciliation more seriously on the basis that there are obvious and transparent 
economic risks to them hi not doing everything they can to discourage a client from 
proceeding with a complaint to the OSS. This might have the twin benefit of 
encouraging a cultural shift in firms' approaches to client complaints towards a more 
pragmatic, client-centred approach and reduce the workload of the OSS and firms in the 
handling of complaints. The cases reviewed for this research evidenced that many of the 
complaints are over quite small bills where costs reductions do not provide much of an 
incentive to firms to 'sit up and take notice'. The potential for sizeable IPS awards might 
make some difference to these cases. Conversely, many firms were already clearly aware 
of the time spent in defending complaints, and of the economic costs of that. Indeed this
65 See, Legal Services Ombudsman (1998)
66 This is the highest award mentioned to the researchers by the OSS.
67 Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998 are more likely 
to be drawn upon by clients and firms in this situation. The ECHR may in any event impact on the current 
procedures if the IPS mechanism was held to be determinative of a client or firm's civil rights and 
obligations.
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was perceived by many of them to be a plea in mitigation when costs reduction and 
compensation where up for decision by the OSS. This indicates one of the dangers of 
confusing the use of compensation with a disciplining function. It also indicates that 
economic incentives alone do not appear likely to persuade all firms to take complaints 
seriously. Similarly, high levels of concern within the profession about the competence 
and independence of the OSS may make raising the compensation limit a difficult step 
for the Law Society or the OSS to take.
There is little convincing evidence that the IPS mechanism has been instrumental in 
changing the attitude of firms to 'service'. Nor has it successfully addressed the concerns 
of client or met with the approval of the profession. A decisive shift towards a 
restitutionary basis of compensation setting will make a statement about client concerns 
without necessarily changing dramatically amounts awarded in IPS cases. It may 
contribute to IPS's regulatory impact. It should certainly clarify and improve the 
responsiveness of the OSS to client needs. It would also clarify the messages sent to the 
profession, although these messages will almost inevitably not be well received by all. It 
may, nevertheless, be more appropriate to persuade practitioners that IPS has real 
consequences for their clients and those real consequences will include real losses.
Some gap between what the rules about IPS say, how decision-makers say they interpret 
that rule, and how the rule is actually interpreted is inevitable. The current level of 
contradiction in the OSS approach goes beyond this and probably alienates clients and 
practitioners alike. The contradictions certainly confuse decision-making and build 
inconsistency into the system. To avoid any suspicion that compensation awards simply 
drop from the palm tree of OSS justice, a clear loss-based framework for awarding 
compensation should be adopted. Arguments will remain over what 'loss' is 'caused' by 
IPS. But the arguments that will be raised will be decided on clear principles. 
Arguments are inevitable: confusion and lack of coherence are not.
Any new approach to compensation will need to be carefully introduced and rigorously 
monitored. The review of OSS decisions has already shown that the policy guidance 
given by Law Society Committees for OSS staff to consider compensation first seems not 
to be followed by decision-makers. All should work together in the future to achieve a 
positive change in culture and approach.
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